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Beyond Labor Law: Private Initiatives to Promote 
Employee Freedom of Association in the Obama Era†* 
WILLIAM B. GOULD IV** 
INTRODUCTION 
This Article first discusses the impact of the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA) and its procedures as they relate to trade union organizing. It then 
describes and analyzes an alternative dispute resolution program—the first of its 
kind anywhere in the United States and perhaps the world—established by the 
British multinational corporation FirstGroup PLC (“FirstGroup” or “the company”) 
to respond to criticisms that the company was failing to protect employees’ 
freedom of association rights in the United States. The Article examines the 
strength and limitations of the process, describes standards adopted by a program to 
resolve disputes against the backdrop of the NLRA, and considers a few issues 
which may arise from the implementation of the program, such as whether 
deference to the program can and should be provided by the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB or “the Board”) (as is the case with grievance-arbitration 
machinery) and whether the process once implemented can become a contract that 
can be enforced by employees or unions. Finally, the Article focuses upon the 
initiatives of the Obama Administration, some of the key decisions and policies of 
the new Obama Board, and the relationship between these efforts and private 
initiatives such as the FirstGroup program. 
I. THE IMPACT OF THE NLRA ON UNION ORGANIZING 
Two developments have fueled the demand for new approaches to the issue of 
trade union organization and recognition and, more specifically, the rights of 
employees to band together for the purpose of obtaining collective representation in 
the workplace. The first is that the labor movement is in considerable trouble, on a 
downward membership slope since 1955 when, at the time of the merger between 
the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and the Congress of Industrial 
Organizations (CIO), union membership reached nearly 35% of those in the 
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workforce.1 The figures in 2010 were approximately 12%, with just under 7% in 
the private sector.2 Today, a majority of union members are public employees;3 
and, had it not been for state legislation modeled in some respects after the NLRA 
itself, the decline for the entire movement would translate into single-digit figures 
that are ascribed to the private sector alone. The decline accelerated considerably in 
the union-hostile decades of the 1980s and 2000s. 
The NLRA has been a factor in this phenomenon, albeit a subordinate one.4 The 
statute, aimed at providing both representation machinery which allows employees 
to select representatives of their own choosing and a code of conduct in the form of 
prohibited unfair labor practices, contains loopholes which foster delay in the 
administrative and judicial process.5 These loopholes have been apparent since the 
1970s.6 This is true for both the unfair labor practice and representation 
machinery.7  
The unfair labor practice machinery lends itself to protracted litigation by a 
multilayered process. Subsequent to an investigation by an NLRB regional office 
as a representative of the independent General Counsel for the Board and the 
issuance of a complaint by such, the process commences with a hearing before a 
career civil servant administrative law judge.8 The process can continue as an 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM: THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYMENT 
RELATIONSHIPS AND THE LAW 18 (1993) [hereinafter GOULD, AGENDA FOR REFORM]. 
 2. News Release, Bureau of Lab. Stats, U.S. Dep’t of Lab., Union Members—2010 
(Jan. 21, 2011). 
 3. Id. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 36.2% of public sector workers are 
union members, compared with 6.9% in the private sector. Id. 
 4. Factors more important than the law are: (1) globalization, which has translated into 
foreign competition in the union strongholds in manufacturing as well as corporate threats 
and the realization of threats to move facilities outside the United States; (2) deregulation in 
the heavily unionized transportation industries which has produced smaller non-union 
competition; (3) a change in the nature of the employment relationship triggered by both 
undocumented workers who are unprotected under the NLRA and the emergence of new 
contingent employees who are relatively vulnerable by virtue of either their temporary or 
independent contractor status; (4) the shift from manufacturing to service, which has 
produced more employer resistance to union organizational activity by virtue of the inability 
of such firms to either absorb or pass on to the public labor costs attributable to benefits in 
collective bargaining agreements; and (5) technological innovation, which has reduced the 
number of blue-collar jobs more susceptible to union organization. See GOULD, AGENDA FOR 
REFORM, supra note 1, at 11–29 (1993) (discussing these and other reasons for the decline of 
union density). 
 5. See GOULD, AGENDA FOR REFORM, supra note 1, at 158–62; WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, 
LABORED RELATIONS: LAW, POLITICS, AND THE NLRB 287–92 (2000) [hereinafter GOULD, 
LABORED RELATIONS]. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. This entire procedure is described in more detail in WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, A 
PRIMER ON AMERICAN LABOR LAW 60–64 (4th ed. 2004) [hereinafter GOULD, PRIMER]. In 
recent years, the administrative law judges have been provided flexibility to fashion so-
called bench decisions either at the hearing itself or within seventy-two hours of its 
completion. Cf. NLRB v. Beverly Enter.-Mass., Inc., 174 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 1999) (allowing 
administrative law judge to issue bench decisions without accepting briefs from the parties).  
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appeal to the Board in Washington, D.C., and, at least a year subsequent to the 
beginning of the process, can result in appeals to the circuit courts of appeals and 
petitions for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court (the overwhelming percentage of 
which are denied).  
Representation cases in which, generally speaking, employees or unions are 
filing a petition with the Board in order to trigger a vote on the question of whether 
a union should represent the employees in an appropriate unit as the exclusive 
bargaining representative, can also produce the same kind of delay—
notwithstanding the fact that the representation machinery is supposed to be more 
expeditious and streamlined.9 Most representation controversies that wind up in the 
hands of the Board and the courts relate to which employees are eligible to vote, 
what the size of the appropriate bargaining unit is, and whether conduct engaged in 
prior to the election has interfered with employee free choice. These delays have 
placed the spotlight on the limited scope and weakness of remedies available under 
the Act.10  
The problem grew worse during the 1980s and 2000s because of the infidelity of 
the NLRB during those periods to the basic principles of freedom of association 
and the promotion of collective bargaining contained in the Act. During the past 
two to three decades, as the administrative adjudication pendulum has swung more 
violently toward an anti-union view, labor and management, as well as Democrats 
and Republicans, have become more polarized on a wide variety of issues including 
labor policy.11  
                                                                                                                 
 
 9. Angelica Healthcare Servs. Grp., Inc., 315 N.L.R.B. 1320 (1995); cf. Am. Fed’n of 
Labor v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940). 
 10. See GOULD, AGENDA FOR REFORM, supra note 1; William B. Gould, Taft-Hartley 
Revisited: The Contrariety of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and the Plight of the 
Unorganized, 13 LAB. L.J. 348 (1962); Theodore J. St. Antoine, A Touchstone for Labor 
Board Remedies, 14 WAYNE L. REV. 1039 (1968); Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing 
Workers’ Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769 (1983). In 
recent years, labor law reform debate has taken the form of discussion of the Employee Free 
Choice Act. William B. Gould IV, New Labor Law Reform Variations on an Old Theme: Is 
the Employee Free Choice Act the Answer?, 70 LA. L. REV. 1 (2009) [hereinafter Gould, 
New Labor Law Reform]; William B. Gould IV, The Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, 
Labor Law Reform, and What Can Be Done About the Broken System of Labor-Management 
Relations Law in the United States, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 291, 316–22 (2008) [hereinafter 
Gould, The Employee Free Choice Act of 2009]. For a good discussion of the weakness of 
the NLRA as opposed to other employment statutes, see generally Morris M. Kleiner & 
David Weil, Evaluating the Effectiveness of National Labor Relations Act Remedies: 
Analysis and Comparison with Other Workplace Penalty Policies (Nat’l Bureau Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 16626, 2010). 
 11. Of course, the swing to different points of view depending upon whether a 
Democrat or Republican occupies the White House is not a new phenomenon. Clyde W. 
Summers, Politics, Policy Making, and the NLRB, 6 SYRACUSE L. REV. 93 (1954); W. 
Willard Wirtz, New National Labor Relations Board; Herein of “Employer Persuasion,” 49 
NW. U. L. REV. 594, 594–95 (1954); cf. Bernard D. Meltzer, Organizational Picketing and 
the NLRB: Five on a Seesaw, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 78 (1962). But the Bush era of the 2000s 
seems to have taken on a dimension more considerable than any of the periods described in 
the cited literature, including the Reagan era itself. See William B. Gould IV, Independent 
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As this has happened, the method of NLRB appointment itself has changed.12 
Said Colby College Professor G. Calvin Mackenzie:  
 What is most distressing ultimately is the transcendent loss of 
purpose in the appointment process. The American model did not 
always work perfectly, but it was informed by a grand notion. The 
business of the people would be managed by leaders drawn from the 
people. Cincinnatus, in-and-outers, non-career managers—with every 
election would come a new sweep of the country for high energy and 
new ideas and fresh visions. The president’s team would assume its 
place and impose the people’s wishes on the great agencies of 
government. Not infrequently, it actually worked that way. 
 But these days, the model fails on nearly all counts. Most appointees 
do not come from the countryside, brimming with new energy and 
ideas. Much more often they come from congressional staffs or think 
tanks or interest groups—not from across the country but from across 
the street: interchangeable public elites, engaged in an insider’s game.13  
As Professor Mackenzie has noted, the appointments made to the Board in the 
past few decades have been disproportionately “inside the Beltway” appointments 
where connections on Capitol Hill and with lobbying organizations are valued more 
than previously obtained expertise in the field of labor-management relations and 
the law.14 Proceeding alongside this phenomenon has been the recently devised so-
called “batching” method of appointment through which a package of nominees is 
confirmed together, which both labor and management and Democrats and 
Republicans can support.15 
Until 1994, when I was confirmed as Chairman and two other Board Members 
and the General Counsel were simultaneously appointed and confirmed due to 
Senator Nancy Kassebaum’s opposition to me, there had been no batching of 
confirmations in fifty-one years after the Taft-Hartley amendments increased the 
number of Board members from three to five, therefore necessitating the 
                                                                                                                 
Adjudication, Political Process, and the State of Labor-Management Relations: The Role of 
the National Labor Relations Board, 82 IND. L.J. 461 (2007); William B. Gould IV, The 
NLRB at Age 70: Some Reflections on the Clinton Board and the Bush II Aftermath, 26 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 309 (2005). 
 12. The following discussion, up to and including the text accompanying note 17, is 
substantially similar to one I have already published in Gould, New Labor Law Reform, 
supra note 10, at 30–32.  
 13. G. CALVIN MACKENZIE, STARTING OVER: THE PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENT PROCESS 
IN 1997 39–40 (1998), reprinted in GOULD, LABORED RELATIONS, supra note 5, at 18.  
 14. These paragraphs have been taken substantially from Gould, New Labor Law, supra 
note 10, at 31–32. 
 15. See New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 130 S. Ct. 2635 (2010). Here, the Court, in a 
5-4 opinion authored by Justice Stevens, held that a two-member NLRB lacked authority to 
issue decisions. Id. at 2645. All of this arose out of the ongoing standoff between 
Republicans and Democrats on NLRB appointees. Note Justice Kennedy’s accurate 
comment in dissent: “During the past two years, events have turned what Congress had 
undoubtedly thought would be an extraordinary circumstance into an ordinary one . . . .” Id. 
at 2650 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). For more on “batching” appointments, see generally 
GOULD, LABORED RELATIONS, supra note 5.  
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simultaneous appointment of a Democrat and Republican in 1947. For the past 
fifteen years, that is, during the Clinton and Bush II administrations, both 
Democratic and Republican Congresses have followed the Kassebaum approach. 
Regrettably, the Obama Administration—which campaigned on a platform of 
“change”—appears to adhere to the new status quo of “batching,” notwithstanding 
the fact that fewer Washington insiders have been appointed.16  
This policy should be abandoned. For, again, Professor Mackenzie has described 
this process well: 
 The tendency to select appointees to an agency as teams and to 
divide up control over the choices has become the norm in Washington. 
The Senate, in fact, often delays confirmation until several nominations 
to the same agency accumulate, thus allowing it to require that the 
President include some nominees who are effectively designated by 
powerful Senators.  
 This kind of batching of nominations rarely happened before the 
present date. Even on the regulatory commissions, whose original 
statutes require that only a bare majority of appointees can be from any 
one party, a vacancy in an opposition party chair was usually filled by 
the President with an enrollee in the opposition party who supported the 
President. These appointments, common for most of this century, came 
to be known as “friendly Indians” and were routinely confirmed by the 
Senate even when it was controlled by the opposition party. But they 
allowed the incumbent President to control the appointment process 
and to shape the majorities on most regulatory commissions. 
 That is nearly impossible these days. The membership of the 
regulatory commissions has become little more than the sum of the set 
of disjointed political calculations. Concerns about fealty to leadership, 
effective teamwork, and intellectual or ideological coherence play 
almost no part in the selection of regulatory commissioners. The 
juggling of political interests dominates. That we as a nation often get 
inconsistent and incoherent regulatory policies should be no surprise to 
those that follow the shuffling and dealing that produces regulatory 
commissioners. 
 An additional complicating factor in “batching” is that the 
Republicans do not have the same incentive to make a deal regarding a 
group of nominees for a particular agency. This is especially so of an 
agency like the National Labor Relations Board which operates under 
statutory principles in which a large number of Republicans do not 
believe. Accordingly . . . all of the incentives are weighted toward 
crippling the agency.17  
Thus, the appointments process, particularly during the past decade and a half, 
has produced, in most instances, the lowest common denominator. In 1997, Senator 
Trent Lott, bargaining with President Clinton in the wake of three years of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 16. Acorn’s Ally at the NLRB, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 2009, at A16 (“The NLRB has both 
GOP and Democratic members, and nominees are typically packaged together to avoid 
hearings.”). This view represents a new myth about the NLRB appointment process. 
 17. MACKENZIE, supra note 13, at 30–31. 
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continuous vacancies and recess appointments, was able to strike a bargain much to 
his liking.18 Lott possessed the necessary leverage since, from his party’s 
perspective, there was no incentive to have the agency move forward.19 The 
opposite was true for President Clinton. In a sense, this has played itself out again 
in 2009 and 2010 as President Obama has faced relentless opposition to his 
nominees as well.20 
All of this has made more pronounced a kind of “black hole” for administrative 
delay involving an infinite number of appeals beginning with the regions and the 
administrative law judges to Washington. Ironically, the speed by which the Board 
produces decisions—always a problem for the agency in the Reagan-Bush I 1980s 
as well as the mid-1990s in the early days of the Clinton presidency—has 
continued to decline21 notwithstanding the fact that the caseload itself has 
diminished considerably over the past decade.22 Deep ideological polarization 
exacerbated by congressional political pressure and consequent scrutiny of the 
Board’s decisions might have been diminished by rulemaking—but generally, thus 
far, there has been unwillingness to take this step.23 In my judgment, the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 18. See GOULD, LABORED RELATIONS, supra note 5, at 249–50. 
 19. See id. at 40. 
 20. Press Release, NLRB, Brian Hayes, Mark Pearce Confirmed by Senate as Board 
Members (June 22, 2010), available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/ 
09031d4580379241; Press Release, White House, President Obama Announces Recess 
Appointments to Key Administration Positions (Mar. 27, 2010), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/president-obama-announces-recess-appointments-
key-administration-positions; see also Hans Nichols & Holly Rosenkrantz, Obama Bypasses 
Senate, Makes Appointments to NLRB, Treasury, BLOOMBERG.COM (Mar. 28, 2010), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aKr_AXeeC82k; Sheryl Gay 
Stolberg, Obama Bypasses Senate Process, Filling 15 Posts, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2010, at 
A1. 
 21. Compare SIXTY SECOND ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS 
BOARD FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 1997 164 (1997) (median of seventy-
nine days from assignment of an unfair labor practices case to the Board to issuance of a 
decision), with SEVENTY-SECOND ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS 
BOARD FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 2007 184 (2007) (median of 517 days). 
While this comparison is admittedly a dramatic one, it highlights a real decline in the 
Board’s average speed in producing decisions over the past two decades. 
 22. See Graphs & Data: Board Decisions Issued, NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/ 
chartsdata/decisions. 
 23. On June 2, 1994, the Board issued an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on 
the issue of the appropriateness of requested single location bargaining units in 
representation cases arising in various industries. See Appropriateness of Requested Single 
Location Bargaining Units in Representation Cases, 59 Fed. Reg. 28,501 (June 2, 1994) 
(advance notice). Thereafter, on September 28, 1995, the Board issued a Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking setting forth a proposed rule applicable to almost all Board cases in which a unit 
of unrepresented employees at a single location was sought. GOULD, LABORED RELATIONS, 
supra note 5, at 262. The proposed rule set forth the factors the Board proposed to use in 
determining the appropriateness of such units. Id. at 71–72. Congress, however, attached a 
rider to the agency’s fiscal year (FY) 1996 appropriations bill, prohibiting the expenditure of 
funds used in any way to promulgate a final rule. Id. at 131. That rider also was attached to 
the agency’s final appropriations bills for FY 1997 and FY 1998. Id. at 168–73. On February 
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combination of statutory limitations, infidelity to the Act’s basic premises by 
NLRB appointees in the 1980s and the early 2000s, and reticence to decide any 
cases by the “insiders” on the ground that it might offend someone and thereby 
impair reappointment prospects for such incumbents, have all been important 
factors in the Board’s tardiness and ineffectiveness. 
Nonetheless, President Obama has bought into the “batching” process which led 
to phenomena so roundly condemned by Professor Mackenzie. He initially 
nominated a Republican Party political stalwart to one of the three vacancies in 
2009–2010 and only backed away when the Republican leadership refused to abide 
by the deal and filibustered the Democratic appointees who were eventually given 
recess appointments without their Republican counterpart!24 Obama was right to do 
this and, on balance, should have stayed away from the batching process for the 
reasons outlined by Professor Mackenzie. But this was only a temporary 
phenomenon in which an agreed-upon batching process was inadvertently 
abandoned. Ultimately President Obama acceded to party stalwarts when 
Republicans allowed one (but not two) of his nominees to be confirmed.25 Like his 
unwillingness to press forward with labor law reform, this posture may trigger later 
difficulties when future nominations are made.26 
President Obama’s acquiescence has tended to contribute to agency paralysis. 
Additionally, when coupled with the above-mentioned developments, it has tended 
to create considerably more interest in private machinery outside the NLRB, the 
NLRA’s procedures, and the development of alternative strategies for union 
organizing. One such strategy has been the use of corporate campaigns by unions to 
induce changes in employer behavior through public pressure.27 In connection with 
                                                                                                                 
23, 1998, the Board (over my dissent) withdrew the proposed rule. See Rules Regarding 
Standardized Remedial Provisions in Board Unfair Labor Practice Decisions and the 
Appropriateness of Single Location Bargaining Units in Representation Cases, 63 Fed. Reg. 
8890–91 (Feb. 23, 1998). Regrettably and predictably, this vote led directly to attempts by 
some members of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human 
Services, Education and Related Agencies to interfere in case adjudication. See GOULD, 
LABORED RELATIONS, supra note 5, at 178–82. This attempt was resisted in my letter of 
March 19, 1998 to the Subcommittee in response. Cf. Am. Hospital Hosp. Ass’n v. NLRB, 
499 U.S. 606, 620 (1991); Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An 
Empirical Portrait of the Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889 (2008). 
 24. See Meredith Shiner, Senate Stops Craig Becker Nomination, POLITICO.COM (Feb. 9, 
2010, 5:00 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0210/32758.html. 
 25. See Steven Greenhouse, Deadlock Is Ending on Labor Board, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 
2010, at B1. 
 26. For a comparison of the remarkable similarities between labor reform initiatives in 
the Clinton and Obama Administrations, see William R. Corbett, “The More Things 
Change . . .”: Reflection on the Stasis of Labor Law in the United States, 56 VILL. L. REV. 
227 (2011). 
 27. These corporate campaigns seem to have been more successful where the union 
undertaking is an international one given the employer’s principal headquarters in Europe, 
where there is more receptiveness to freedom of association and collective bargaining. See 
Louis Uchitelle, Globalization, Union-Style, AM. PROSPECT, Dec. 2010, at A6. Another 
pressure point opportunity arises where the employer is a government contractor which 
might be subtly influenced by government itself. My Board took jurisdiction over 
government contractors, despite the argument that they were infused with public employer 
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these campaigns, unions frequently have sought and negotiated recognition 
procedures providing for a card check procedure, which is based upon majority 
employee support manifested through the execution of authorization cards, or a 
privately conducted election. Both of these procedures frequently involve private 
arbitrators who are appointed to resolve controversies. Other negotiated terms may 
include expanded union access to private property beyond that which is provided 
by federal labor law, limitations on employer speech against the union, limitations 
on union speech against the employer, prohibitions against captive audience 
meetings and interrogation of employees, and proposed procedural and substantive 
terms of a collective bargaining agreement to be negotiated if union recognition is 
realized.28 However, in an extremely trenchant and persuasive article, Professor 
Laura Cooper highlighted the limitations of such initiatives.29 In essence, the 
arbitrator may be called upon to interpret policies which give rise to disputes under 
the NLRA itself or are alien to contractual disputes to which the arbitrator may be 
accustomed to addressing under the collective bargaining agreement.30 However, 
                                                                                                                 
characteristics and thus beyond the jurisdiction of the Act and the Board. See Pikesville 
United Methodist Hosp., Inc. v. United Steelworkers, 109 F.3d 1146 (6th Cir. 1997) 
(enforcing 318 N.L.R.B. 1107 (1995)); Teledyne Econ. Dev. v. NLRB, 108 F.3d 56 (4th Cir. 
1997) (enforcing 321 N.L.R.B. 58 (1996)); Mgmt. Training Corp., 317 N.L.R.B. 1355 
(1995). Some of the Board’s rulings addressing the demarcation line between government 
and private sectors are more torturous and less clear. See Enrichment Servs. Program, Inc., 
325 N.L.R.B. 818, 821 (1998) (Gould, Chairman, concurring); Okla. Zoological Trust, 325 
N.L.R.B. 171, 172 (1997) (Gould, Chairman, dissenting).  
  A third avenue for union pressure lies in the existence of highly visible employees 
with which the public might be induced to sympathize because of their poor conditions. 
Illustrative of the last mentioned group are the janitors who were the object of a “Justice for 
Janitors” campaign, see Christopher L. Erickson, Catherine Fisk, Ruth Milkman, Daniel J.B. 
Mitchell & Kent Wong, Justice for Janitors in Los Angeles and Beyond: A New Form of 
Unionism in the Twenty-first Century?, in THE CHANGING ROLE OF UNIONS: NEW FORMS OF 
REPRESENTATION 22 (Phanindra V. Wunnava ed., 2004), agricultural workers, see Herman 
M. Levy, The Agricultural Labor Relations Act of 1975: La Esperanza de California para el 
Futuro, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 783 (1975), and household employees or domestic servants, 
see Domestic Workers Bill of Rights, Assemb. A01470, 2009–2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 
2010) (codified in part at N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 160, 161, 170 (McKinney Supp. 2010)) 
(providing domestic workers in New York with the same protections most other workers 
have enjoyed for decades). Governor Paterson signed the New York legislation on August 
31, 2010, and the law went into effect on November 29, 2010. Id. The last two groups 
(agricultural and household employees) are beyond the coverage of federal law through the 
NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006). 
 28. The Board has correctly held that a framework for future collective bargaining is 
neither inconsistent with Majestic Weaving Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 859 (1964), enforcement 
denied, 355 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1966), nor with International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ 
Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961), upon which the Board’s holding in Majestic Weaving 
rests. See Dana Corp., 356 N.L.R.B. 1 (2010). See generally Gould, The Employee Free 
Choice Act of 2009, supra note 10, at 322–24 (discussing so-called conditional recognition 
agreements and advocating their compatibility with the NLRA).  
 29. Laura J. Cooper, Privatizing Labor Law: Neutrality/Card Check Agreements and the 
Role of the Arbitrator, 83 IND. L.J. 1589 (2008). 
 30. William B. Gould IV, A Half Century of the Steelworkers Trilogy: Fifty Years of 
Ironies Squared, in ARBITRATION 2010: THE STEELWORKERS TRILOGY AT 50: PROCEEDINGS OF 
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Cooper pointed out that more fundamental problems relate to limits that are 
imposed upon the arbitrator on issues of fact.31  
First, the arbitrator presides over an adversarial process whereby unions and 
employers seek out employees to support their position without those employees 
having counsel or separate representation. This is in relative contrast to the role of 
the NLRB in representation matters where the Board has independent investigatory 
powers and takes all evidence so as to obtain as full a factual picture as possible. 
Second, “[a]lthough the NLRB has clear and broad subpoena authority as well 
as the ability . . . to obtain information by making a party aware of the agency’s 
power to decide issues adversely in the absence of requested information, the 
existence of arbitral authority to subpoena witnesses and documents and to issue 
discovery orders is far from clear.”32  
Third, in a negotiated, grievance-arbitration machinery context, the discovery 
process takes place at the lower steps of the grievance process, and the union is able 
to play a monitoring role to protect employees against potential retaliation. In 
representation disputes, the union is unable to play that role, and the third party 
arbitral process provides no promise of confidentiality as does the NLRB.  
Despite these and other limitations outlined by Professor Cooper with respect to 
certain privately negotiated procedures, unions and employers continue to enter 
into these sorts of arrangements, again, often times stemming from a corporate 
campaign conducted by one or more unions against an employer. In the case of 
FirstGroup, however, the company adopted a different approach in connection with 
its corporate social responsibility policy and in the face of a corporate campaign by 
several unions. That approach was the implementation of a Freedom of Association 
Policy (“FoA Policy”) and Independent Monitor Program to monitor compliance 
with the policy. 
II. GLOBALIZATION & CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
During the same period of union decline discussed above, economic 
globalization rapidly increased.33 While U.S. corporations look for strategic 
opportunities abroad, foreign corporations likewise look to the United States as a 
rich source for investment and expansion opportunities, no doubt triggered, in part, 
                                                                                                                 
THE SIXTY-THIRD ANNUAL MEETING: NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 35 (Paul D. 
Staudohar & Mark I. Lurie eds., 2010); William B. Gould, Labor Arbitration of Grievances 
Involving Racial Discrimination, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 40 (1969).  
 31. Professor Cooper has emphasized the fact that arbitrators  
acting under neutrality/card check agreements . . . are left with a decidedly 
inferior ability accurately to determine the facts underlying disputed issues. . . . 
[T]he adversarial arbitral process may put vulnerable workers at risk since it 
requires potential employee witnesses to be interviewed in private by interested 
parties and obligates them to give their testimony in open hearings before 
unions and employers alike.  
Cooper, supra note 29, at 1613. 
 32. Id. at 1612. Cf. Laura J. Cooper, Discovery in Labor Arbitration, 72 MINN. L. REV. 
1281 (1988) (setting forth the limitations of, and ambiguity surrounding, discovery in the 
arbitration process). 
 33. Uchitelle, supra note 27. 
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by lower American wages and conditions of employment as compared to Europe. 
Although foreign businesses have operated in North America since the days of 
colonization, the recent expansion of economic globalization has led to more and 
more foreign companies operating and investing in businesses in the United 
States.34 FirstGroup is just one such example.35  
Foreign companies likely will continue to play a prominent role in the U.S. 
economy. Despite identifiable benefits that foreign investment brings to the United 
States, challenges exist for foreign multinational companies doing business in the 
United States. One such challenge, and one that FirstGroup has faced, is in the area 
of labor relations.  
Although the principles of the NLRA are fundamentally sound, the protections 
for employees’ rights to freedom of association in the United States are not as 
robust as international standards to which many foreign companies, particularly 
European-based ones, have committed themselves and to which their shareholders 
hold them. For example, many European companies voluntarily commit themselves 
to codes of corporate governance and international standards, including the United 
Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Labour 
Organization Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, and the 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises established by the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, among others. This focus on corporate 
citizenship has increased steadily since the 1970s, when investors began directing 
their money based on corporations’ social, environmental, and ethical 
performances. Since that time, dozens of organizations have formed to evaluate 
companies’ performance and adherence to socially responsible policies, and 
investment funds with billions of dollars of capital to invest have directed their 
investments based on companies’ records in this area. Because of the voluntary 
nature of these codes of conduct, effective, independent, and transparent 
monitoring is a critical component of evaluating meaningful and measurable 
standards.36 
                                                                                                                 
 
 34. “More than five million Americans, or roughly 10 percent of the [U.S.] industrial 
workforce, [are] employed by companies based overseas.” MICHELINE MAYNARD, THE 
SELLING OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: HOW FOREIGN COMPANIES ARE REMAKING THE 
AMERICAN DREAM 2 (2009). Furthermore, “more than 560,000 Californians earn a paycheck 
from a firm based outside the United States.” Id. at 25. 
 35. Other examples of major foreign employers include Toyota, Honda, Nissan, 
Hyundai, Unilever, Tesco, Sony, the Tata Group of India, the European Aeronautic Defense 
and Space Company (EADS), Haier of China, Nestlé of Switzerland, Severstal of Russia, 
ArcelorMittal of Luxembourg, and InBev of Belgium (owner of Anheuser-Busch). Foreign 
companies have invested more than $2 trillion in the American economy and opened or 
expanded nearly 760 American factories. MAYNARD, supra note 34, at 22. See generally 
Matthew J. Slaughter, How U.S. Multinational Companies Strengthen the U.S. Economy, 
BUS. ROUNDTABLE & U.S. COUNCIL FOUND. (Spring 2009), available at 
http://businessroundtable.org/uploads/studies-reports/downloads/Slaughter_Paper-Color.pdf. 
 36. See Michael Posner & Justine Nolan, Can Codes of Conduct Play a Role in 
Promoting Workers’ Rights?, in INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS: GLOBALIZATION, 
TRADE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 207 (Robert J. Flanagan & William B. Gould IV eds., 2003). 
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In 2001, FirstGroup implemented a corporate social responsibility (CSR) policy, 
which encompasses the international codes and standards listed above, among 
others.37  
One of the many commitments undertaken by the company in its CSR policy is 
adherence to the following principle:  
Employees have the rights of freedom of association and collective 
bargaining. We respect the right of our employees to choose whether or 
not to join a trade union without influence or interference from 
management. Furthermore we support the right of our employees to 
exercise that right through a secret ballot.38  
This commitment stems from principles promulgated by the International Labour 
Organization (ILO), which include employees’ right to freedom of association. As 
discussed in greater detail below, several unions used FirstGroup’s public 
commitment to its CSR policy and the principles and codes of conduct set forth 
therein to exert pressure on the company to alter alleged anti-union conduct of 
company managers in the United States. This pressure led the company to formally 
adopt a specific Freedom of Association Policy and Independent Monitor Program 
in the United States. 
III. FIRSTGROUP PLC 
FirstGroup is a United Kingdom-based company and is the world’s leading 
transport operator with revenues of over £5 billion.39 The company employs more 
than 130,000 staff throughout the United Kingdom and North America and 
transports around 2.5 billion passengers each year.40 The company that exists today 
grew out of the deregulation of bus services in the United Kingdom. In 1989, 
employees of a municipal bus operator for Aberdeen, Scotland (Grampian Regional 
Transport), bought GRT and substantially owned it under an Employee Share 
Ownership Plan.41 The company acquired several other former nationalized bus 
companies in England and Scotland and merged with the Badgerline Group in June 
1995 to form FirstBus.42 FirstBus continued to grow by acquiring other English, 
Welsh, and Scottish nationalized operators and was renamed FirstGroup in 1998 
when the company acquired railway businesses as a result of privatization of the 
railways in the United Kingdom.43 
                                                                                                                 
 
 37. For the current version of the company’s CSR policy, see CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY POLICY, FIRSTGROUP PLC (May 2011), available at 
http://www.firstgroup.com/assets/pdfs/csr/csr_policy_2011.pdf. 
 38. Id. at 13.  
 39. Our Company, FIRSTGROUP PLC, http://www.firstgroup.com/corporate/ 
our_company. 
 40. Id. 
 41. William B. Gould IV, Using an Independent Monitor to Resolve Union-Organizing 
Disputes Outside the NLRB: The FirstGroup Experience, DISP. RESOL. J., May/July 2011, at 
49 [hereinafter Gould, Using an Independent Monitor]. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
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In 1999, FirstGroup sought to strengthen and diversify its business by acquiring 
Ryder Public Transportation in the United States, thereby forming FirstGroup 
America.44 The purchase made FirstGroup the second largest operator of school 
buses (First Student) and a leading provider of transit management (First Transit) 
and vehicle maintenance services (First Services) in the United States. FirstGroup 
viewed the purchase as a strategic step which would allow the company to apply its 
public transportation experience and expertise in the U.S. market. FirstGroup had 
recognized that the school bus market was highly fragmented and that there had 
been a steady increase in outsourcing of school bus transportation to the private 
sector. 
About eight years later, on February 7, 2007, FirstGroup agreed to purchase 
Laidlaw International, Inc. for $3.6 billion.45 Laidlaw was the largest operator of 
yellow school buses, provided transit services, and owned and operated 
Greyhound.46 The deal closed on September 30, 2007, making First Student the 
leading student transportation provider in North America, serving more than 1500 
school districts with more than 60,000 buses.47 The deal also increased operations 
at First Transit, which now employs 15,500 people and operates 7000 buses out of 
235 locations in forty-one states, Canada, and Puerto Rico.48 FirstGroup also 
retained the Greyhound name and continued to identify strategic opportunities to 
develop the Greyhound business.49  
When FirstGroup acquired Ryder, some of the facilities that it inherited were 
already organized by several different unions who continued to organize other 
locations. Shortly after FirstGroup’s entrée into the United States, the International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters contacted colleagues in the Transport and General 
Workers Union (TGWU) in the United Kingdom—the largest union representing 
bus workers at FirstGroup—to gather information about the company. Over the 
next few years, representatives from the TGWU, the Teamsters, the International 
Transport Workers’ Federation, and others met to discuss FirstGroup’s North 
American business.50 
Beginning in 2004, after being frustrated by alleged anti-union tactics by 
FirstGroup America and poor working conditions, the Teamsters, the TGWU, and 
the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) escalated pressure on 
                                                                                                                 
 
 44. On September 13, 1999, FirstGroup completed the acquisition of Ryder Public 
Transportation Services, Inc. (“Ryder”) for $934 million. FIRSTGROUP, ANNUAL REPORT 12 
(2000), available at http://www.firstgroup.com/corporate/investors/annualreports.php. 
FirstGroup also acquired Bruce Transportation Group, Inc., a school bus operator in New 
England, for $12.6 million on September 14, 1999. Id. At this time, other U.K. operators 
were also moving into the U.S. market—Stagecoach acquired Coach USA, the bus and taxi 
operation, and National Express acquired Durham Transportation, North America’s fourth 
largest school bus operator.  
 45. Gould, Using an Independent Monitor, supra note 41, at 50. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
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FirstGroup.51 The unions campaigned against FirstGroup in the United Kingdom,52 
held rallies at FirstGroup offices in the United Kingdom and United States,53 
worked with a U.K. lobbyist firm to communicate its positions to members of 
Parliament,54 hosted a week-long fact-finding mission to the United States for two 
MPs and a member of the London Assembly,55 communicated directly to the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 51. Alistair Osborne, US and British Unions Combine to Use Their Muscle, DAILY TEL. 
(London), Nov. 10, 2004, at 31. One example of the company’s alleged anti-union position 
was a letter to staff from a manager at FirstGroup’s Jacksonville, Florida, location. Id. The 
manager wrote, “It is our company’s position that a union is unnecessary and would not 
benefit our customers, employees or businesses.” Id. In response, Moir Lockhead, 
FirstGroup’s chief executive, stated, “If there is a question mark over the language used in 
our America managers’ communications with employees then we will look at it,” and 
alleged that some staff were being harassed to join the SEIU which was “totally 
unacceptable.” Id. 
 52. In the fall of 2004, the unions described FirstGroup’s operations as a “‘creeping 
Americanization’ of UK bus services” and “a ‘race to the bottom’ in workers’ pay and 
service standards.” Kristy Dorsey, Union Protests at FirstGroup’s ‘Creeping 
Americanisation’ of UK Bus Services, HERALD (Glasgow, Scotland), Oct. 15, 2004, at 31. Of 
course, the labor relations, laws, and culture of the United States and United Kingdom are 
quite different in a number of respects. See generally William B. Gould, Taft-Hartley Comes 
to Great Britain: Observations on the Industrial Relations Act of 1971, 81 YALE L.J. 1421 
(1972). 
 53. In 2004, the unions held rallies or marches at FirstGroup offices in Paddington, 
London, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, and Minnesota. See Osborne, supra note 51, at 31. In 
April 2007, the Teamsters held a rally in the United States to highlight claims of anti-union 
activity, alleging that FirstGroup had failed to implement a neutrality policy toward union 
membership and created an atmosphere of hostility and harassment. Ian Forsyth, First 
Denies US Union’s Claims of Harassment, PRESS & J. (Aberdeen, Scot.), Apr. 10, 2007, at 
17. 
 54. In November 2004, Mr. Lockhead received a letter from MPs sponsored by the 
TGWU expressing their disappointment at the company’s anti-union stance in the United 
States. In the fall of 2005, the unions lobbied at a Labor Party conference, handing out a 
dossier that lambasted FirstGroup for its service standards, reliability, and treatment of 
workers. Simon Bain, FirstGroup Claims US Trade Union Lobbyists Are ‘Mischief-Makers,’ 
HERALD (Glasgow, Scotland), Sept. 29, 2005, at 22. 
 55. A spokesperson for the SEIU stated, “[w]e think these things need to be brought to 
light in the UK, where MPs are uncomfortable having a leading British company accused of 
this kind of conduct in the US.” David Perry, FirstGroup Face Protest from Angry U.S. 
Union, PRESS & J. LTD. (Aberdeen, Scot.), July 4, 2005, at 6. The mission’s report on its 
June 2005 visit concluded:  
It appears from our discussions with management that the aggressive pursuit by 
First Student of market share, based upon underpricing other tenders, is based 
to a great extent on reducing the terms and conditions of employees against 
those in both the publiclyowned school bus services and those of other 
employers.  
Karl West, Bus Giant Faces Anti-Union Accusation: Angry Delegation from U.S. Subsidiary 
FirstStudent Brings Its Fight to Annual Meeting in Aberdeen, HERALD (Glasgow, Scot.), July 
13, 2005, at 21 (quotation marks omitted). In July 2007, pressure continued to mount from 
the U.K. government when Gwyneth Dunwoody, MP, chair of the House of Commons 
Transport Select Committee, (i) sponsored an adjournment debate in Parliament on July 24 
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shareholders accusations of FirstGroup America’s anti-union policies and poor 
wages and benefits,56 and made other public statements.57 The Teamsters also 
commissioned several studies of alleged violations of workers’ rights of freedom of 
association under international human rights law.58 
Throughout the campaign, FirstGroup repeatedly denied that the campaign was 
propaganda;59 accused the unions of bullying its employees in the school bus 
                                                                                                                 
arguing that FirstGroup should honor International Labour Organization standards, and (ii) 
joined trade union representatives in warning FirstGroup that it needed to act on a growing 
“anti-union” reputation in the United States or risk tarnishing its image with U.K. and 
European investors. Nathalie Thomas, MP Warns ‘Anti-Union’ FirstGroup that U.S. School 
Bus Row Could Hit Investment, SCOTLAND ON SUNDAY, July 29, 2007, at 2. 
 56. At the July 2005 FirstGroup annual general meeting for shareholders (AGM), a 
delegation from the SEIU drove a yellow school bus to the meeting to communicate directly 
to the shareholders. Frank Urquhart, Union Stages FirstGroup Protest, SCOTSMAN (Scot.), 
July 15, 2005, at 53. A First Student driver from New Jersey stated:  
We are getting anti-union comments and notices put in our pay cheques every 
week, as well as anti-union posters put up in our employee trailers. They [the 
company] have put a sense of fear and intimidation to drivers and school 
monitors that they might lose their bonuses or even their jobs if they join the 
union.  
Id. (alteration in original). At the July 2006 AGM, the Teamsters handed out copies of a May 
2006 report by Lance Compa, see infra note 58, and drivers from the United States described 
aggressive anti-union campaigning by FirstGroup involving posters, banners, leaflets, and 
letters in the period of time leading up to union elections. At the July 2007 AGM, the 
Teamsters again called for the Company to adopt a workers’ rights policy and to enforce it. 
First Student employees who were present at the meeting refuted claims that no evidence of 
anti-union behavior could be found in the United States, though the union welcomed an 
apparent agreement by Chairman Martin Gilbert to look into the credibility of the reports. 
 57. One such example is from February 2007, when FirstGroup announced its plans to 
purchase Laidlaw. IBT President James Hoffa pledged to resist any deal because the union 
was concerned “that FirstGroup’s troubling labor and service record could negatively impact 
Laidlaw’s existing relationships with school districts and the long-term profitability of the 
new company.” Karl West, FirstGroup Fights Unions Over Stake in U.S. Buses, DAILY MAIL 
(U.K.), Feb. 8, 2007, at 68. 
 58. In May 2006, Lance Compa, an attorney and professor specializing in international 
labor and human rights law, issued a thirty-three-page report titled, Freedom of Association 
and Workers’ Rights Violations at First Student, Inc.: Report and Analysis Under 
International Human Rights and Labor Rights Standards, reporting evidence of alleged anti-
union behavior by the Company. In October 2006, Mr. Compa issued a report titled, Follow-
Up Report: Freedom of Association and Workers’ Rights Violations at First Student, Inc., in 
which Mr. Compa found that U.S. First Student management failed to implement the 
promised neutrality stance. In March 2007, the Teamsters published a twenty-eight-page 
report titled, FirstGroup’s Neutrality Policy: Failed Implementation—A Trio of Expert 
Policy Assessments, which was a collection of reports from three different professionals 
whom the Teamsters asked to analyze the company’s adherence to its stated neutrality 
policy. All three authors concluded that FirstGroup’s behavior in the United States was not 
neutral. See LANCE COMPA, JOHN LOGAN & FRED FEINSTEIN, FIRSTGROUP’S NEUTRALITY 
POLICY: FAILED IMPLEMENTATION 10, 21, 28 (2007). 
 59. In November 2004, FirstGroup stated, “[i]n the U.S. all of our employees are free to 
join a trade union” and noted that 18% of its school bus staff were unionized. Alistair 
Osborne, U.S. and British Unions Use Their Combined Muscle, DAILY TEL. (U.K.), Nov. 10, 
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industry into becoming union members;60 communicated the company’s neutral 
stance to its shareholders;61 commissioned a former MP to give an independent 
view on the company’s operations;62 and committed to eradicating anti-union 
behavior at its U.S. operations.63 FirstGroup also issued an internal policy on 
employee relations labeled, “The Group’s neutral view on union membership,”64 
and appointed observers to provide oversight of the company’s policy.65 However, 
                                                                                                                 
2004, at 31. In July 2005, a company spokesman said, “[t]he allegation that the company is 
anti-union is complete nonsense.” Yellow Bus in Protest Over Transport Giant, EVENING 
EXPRESS (U.K.), July 4, 2005, at 4. In response to a union rally in April 2007, the Company 
stated, “[w]e are absolutely committed to the policy of neutrality and continue to monitor its 
application.” Ian Forsyth, First Denies U.S. Union’s Claims of Harassment, PRESS & J. 
(Aberdeen, Scot.), Apr. 10, 2007, at 17. 
 60. See Robert Ballantyne, FirstGroup Feuds with U.S. Union, SUNDAY TIMES 
(London), July 3, 2005, at 4. 
 61. At the July 2005 AGM, Mr. Lockhead told shareholders, “FirstGroup’s policy 
towards trade unions is clear: staff are free to choose whether or not to join a union and to 
take that decision in secret ballot. We will not sign away that right.” Frank Urquhart, Union 
Stages FirstGroup Protest, SCOTSMAN (Scot.), July 15, 2005, at 53. In response to a 
resolution proposed by employee and institutional shareholders at the July 2006 AGM— 
calling on the Company to adopt a human rights policy based on international labor 
conventions and to report to shareholders on material risks that could arise as a result of 
Company labor practices—the Company took the position that the resolution was not 
necessary because the Company’s already existing policies adequately addressed the matters 
called for in the resolution. Ian Forsyth, Employee Investors Hoping to Drive Changes at Bus 
Giant, PRESS & J. (Aberdeen, Scot.), May 17, 2006, at 21. 
 62. Following the July 2005 AGM, FirstGroup invited former Glasgow MP and 
prominent trade unionist John Lyons to visit its U.S. operations in September 2005. On 
October 20, 2005, Mr. Lyons issued a report titled, “Investigation into Vehicle Safety and 
Anti-Trade Union Behaviour at First Student,” which concluded that “in the past, managers 
at First Student were clearly anti-trade union” but that “today the situation is quite different.” 
COMPA, supra note 58, at 30 (May 2006 Report). However, at the July 2006 AGM, Mr. 
Lyons stated, “[t]he trade unions are right when they say there is all sorts of material which 
is anti-union. That was the case in Baltimore and Iowa. These are very heated debates, but 
there is still no excuse—and I have made this point to the board. If the company makes a 
commitment to be neutral, each individual manager should ensure that is the situation, and 
clearly that did not happen.” Graeme Smith, FirstGroup to Root Out Anti-Union Practices: 
Complaints About Some U.S. Management to Be Followed Up, HERALD (Glasgow, Scot.), 
July 14, 2006, at 21. 
 63. At the July 2006 AGM, Chairman Martin Gilbert promised to “stamp out anti-union 
behaviour” by senior managers at First Student and that the Company “would ‘do everything 
in its power’ to ensure the company was neutral on the issue of employee representation.” 
Barrie Clement, FirstGroup to Stamp Out U.S. Union Bashing, INDEPENDENT (U.K.), July 
14, 2006, at 54. Mr. Gilbert also reported that the Company had hired Mr. Lyons to travel to 
the United States at least four times a year and report to the board of directors to make sure 
its policy of strict neutrality towards union recognition was not being abused in the United 
States. Id.; see also Letter from Moir Lockhead, to Graham Stringer, MP (July 7, 2006) (on 
file with author) (pledging to “support the principles” of ILO Conventions on workers’ 
freedom of association). 
 64. Gould, Using an Independent Monitor, supra note 41, at 50. This document served 
as the basis for the more widely distributed Freedom of Association Policy in 2008. Id. 
 65. The observers were asked to (i) observe activities during secret ballot elections; (ii) 
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criticisms of the observers arose and allegations of anti-union behavior continued. 
This led to the company contacting me about serving as Independent Monitor of 
FirstGroup’s Freedom of Association Policy in the United States. After a series of 
meetings between myself and Mr. Lockhead and other company officials, as well 
as correspondence from Mr. Lockhead to shareholders and the Teamsters,66 the 
FirstGroup Independent Monitor Program (the “Program”) commenced as of 
January 1, 2008.67 
Initially, it was unclear whether the unilaterally implemented Program would be 
accepted by the unions and whether the employees and front-line managers would 
know about it.68 However, on January 25, 2008, Mr. Lockhead referred two 
complaints to the Program, which provided the Program with its first opportunity to 
investigate and report on alleged violations of the company’s FoA Policy.69 Also, 
                                                                                                                 
confidentially interview employees and managers; and (iii) prepare reports to FirstGroup 
which summarized their findings. Id. 
 66. In August 2007, external counsel for FirstGroup contacted me. In mid-November, I 
met Mr. Lockhead and agreed to become FirstGroup America’s Independent Monitor of the 
Company’s FoA Policy. Following the meeting, Mr. Lockhead distributed a letter to 
shareholders notifying them of the Company’s appointment of me as the Independent 
Monitor of the FirstGroup FoA Policy. Mr. Lockhead similarly sent a letter dated December 
5, 2007, to Mr. Hoffa of the Teamsters announcing the adoption of the FirstGroup 
Independent Monitor Program. 
 67. During December 2007 and early January 2008, I had several meetings and 
telephone conversations with FirstGroup corporate representatives to set the groundwork for 
the Program. And, at that time, I also put together a team of experienced labor law and labor 
relations professionals, who were based both in the Midwest and on the West Coast of the 
United States, to assist me in investigating complaints that were filed through the Program. 
 68. On January 14, 2008, Mr. Hoffa sent Mr. Lockhead a letter expressing serious 
concerns regarding FirstGroup’s adoption of the Independent Monitor Program. Letter from 
James Hoffa, President, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, to Moir Lockhead, Chief 
Executive Officer, FirstGroup PLC (Jan. 14, 2008) (on file with author). Mr. Hoffa 
explained that the Teamsters welcomed an Independent Monitor and were pleased with my 
appointment, but stated the Teamsters’ belief that the Program would fail without “robust” 
processes in place to ensure implementation and enforcement that would distinguish the 
Program from the existing observers whose credibility, in his view, was lost at the 2007 
AGM. Id. Mr. Hoffa also questioned FirstGroup’s decision to unilaterally adopt the Program 
without seeking a dialogue with the Teamsters. Id. On January 24, I met with representatives 
of the Teamsters union regarding the Program. At that meeting the procedures were 
explained to the Teamsters’ Organizing Department, which expressed considerable interest 
and support for the process and raised questions about it. In April 2008, I met again with 
representatives of the Teamsters to discuss the Program and to obtain input. The Teamsters 
representatives had several requests and proposals for how the Program should function. 
 69. Mr. Lockhead sent me a letter requesting that I investigate certain allegations made 
by the Teamsters of anti-union behavior at a First Student facility in Hodgkins, Illinois, and 
First Transit facilities in Atlanta, Georgia. The allegations surrounding the Hodgkins, Illinois 
facility had been the subject of letters between Mr. Lockhead and Mr. Hoffa at the end of 
2007, as well as the subject of a six-page report issued by former NLRB General Counsel, 
Fred Feinstein, whom the Teamsters had asked to examine and assess the union organizing 
campaign in Hodgkins. In response to the Company’s announcement on October 1, 2007, 
that it had closed its acquisition of Laidlaw, Mr. Hoffa had written Mr. Lockhead to reiterate 
the Teamsters’ concern about FirstGroup’s ability to enforce its corporate policy of 
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beginning in February 2008, the Teamsters filed several complaints alleging FoA 
Policy violations at a number of First Student facilities.70 By the time of the 
company’s July 2008 AGM, representatives of the Teamsters spoke favorably 
about the Program.71 In addition, as described below, several steps were taken to 
publicize the Program; and, at a managers’ meeting in February 2008, 
Mr. Lockhead spoke alongside me and advised FirstGroup senior managers that if 
any of them objected to the FoA Policy or the Program then they could simply 
resign. 
IV. FIRSTGROUP’S INDEPENDENT MONITOR PROGRAM: AN ALTERNATIVE 
RESPONSE TO UNION ORGANIZING DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
FirstGroup’s FoA Policy and Independent Monitor Program were designed to 
promote employees’ rights within the backdrop of the principles of the NLRA, as 
defined by the NLRB during these past seventy-five years of its existence, and the 
principles of international labor law as reflected in Conventions 87 and 98 of the 
International Labour Organization.72 In contrast to many neutrality agreements 
                                                                                                                 
neutrality toward unions. Letter from James Hoffa, President, International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters to Moir Lockhead, Chief Executive Officer, FirstGroup PLC (2007) (on file with 
author). Mr. Hoffa reported that since the acquisition, workers had witnessed flagrant 
violations of the neutrality policy at former Laidlaw locations, including Hodgkins. Id. Mr. 
Lockhead responded by letter dated November 2, 2007, in which Mr. Lockhead explained 
that, following the acquisition, all of the company’s management teams had been made fully 
aware of the company’s FoA Policy and that his understanding was that there had been 
general compliance with the FoA Policy. Letter from Moir Lockhead, Chief Executive 
Officer, FirstGroup PLC to James Hoffa, President, International Brotherhood of Teamsters 
(Nov. 2, 2007) (on file with author). Mr. Hoffa responded by letter dated January 10, 2008, 
raising concerns about FirstGroup’s investigations of the alleged violations and summarizing 
findings from Mr. Feinstein’s report that supported his concerns about the company’s ability 
to implement and enforce its FoA Policy. Letter from James Hoffa, President, International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, to Moir Lockhead, Chief Executive Officer, FirstGroup PLC 
(Jan. 10, 2008) (on file with author). The Independent Monitor ultimately concluded that Mr. 
Feinstein’s report was baseless. 
 70. Gould, Using an Independent Monitor, supra note 41, at 51. 
 71. In June 2008, the Teamsters questioned whether the Company would abide by the 
recommendations of the Independent Monitor. However, at the Company’s July 2008 AGM, 
Frederick Potter, International Vice President of the IBT and Local President for Teamsters 
Local 469 in New Jersey, commented, “Stakeholders agree to this bilateral approach 
[referring to the Program as a novel approach to the FoA Policy] instead of an anti-union 
approach, and this makes sense.” Note of Shareholder Questions/Comments, First Group 
PLC Annual General Meeting 1 (July 10, 2008) (on file with author). Kim Keller, Deputy 
Director of Organizing for the Teamsters also stated:  
I am so pleased to report that the observation of the unions (in the US) is that 
the Compliance Monitoring Program works well in the US and is an innovative, 
progressive program to improve labor relations. I commend William Gould and 
the detailed investigations and his reports. The Independent Compliance 
Monitor has rolled back anti-union behaviour in the US and reports in US 
locations of misconduct have lessened.  
Id.  
 72. See Int’l Lab. Org., Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise 
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noted above, a basic premise of the Program was that the actual recognition process 
would continue to proceed through the NLRB process while matters involving 
alleged management interference with union organizing and related anti-union 
conduct would be handled by the Independent Monitor’s office. Under the FoA 
Policy, recognition issues were to be resolved by the Board itself through the secret 
ballot box election process, rather than any form of card check alternative. A key 
assumption and consideration was that a resolution of freedom of association issues 
involved in union organizational campaigns would reduce or eliminate 
impediments to free and fair elections—and would do so in a more timely manner 
and under standards more rigorous than those provided by the NLRA itself.73  
The principal components of FirstGroup’s Independent Monitor Program were 
the following74:  
First, any FirstGroup employee, third-party representative of an employee, or 
representative of a labor union that represents or is seeking to represent employees 
of FirstGroup could file with the Office of the Independent Monitor (OIM) a 
complaint alleging one or more violations of the company’s FoA Policy. Examples 
of complaints that the OIM received included allegations that a manager or 
supervisor discriminated against an employee based on union activity, made anti-
union comments, enforced overly broad no-talking, solicitation, and distribution 
rules, or prohibited the wearing of union insignia, among other things. Complaints 
needed to be submitted within sixty days of the alleged violation, and submitting a 
complaint form did not affect the right to file an unfair labor practice charge or to 
complain to any public agency. 
Second, the OIM would investigate the allegations and report its findings to 
FirstGroup and the complaining party, generally within thirty to sixty days of the 
filing of the complaint. The investigative process would include telephonic and/or 
in-person interviews of the complaining party, relevant witnesses, and company 
management. Both sides also would have the opportunity, but were not required, to 
submit written materials in support of or opposition to the complaint. If the OIM 
found a violation of the FoA Policy, then the report would include non-binding 
recommendations to the company to cure the violation. 
Third, the company would respond to the OIM’s report within thirty days of 
receiving the report, either adopting, not adopting, or modifying the 
recommendations. To provide transparency to the process, the company’s response 
was sent to both the OIM and the complaining party. 
                                                                                                                 
Convention (Sept. 9, 1948), available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C087; 
Int’l Lab. Org., Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention (Jan. 7, 1949), 
available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C098. 
 73. Because my view is that the right not to associate is subsumed in the right of 
association contained in the FoA Policy and the NLRA, FirstGroup was obliged to favor 
neither the pro- nor the anti-union groups in organizational campaigns. As the unions were 
not signatories to the Program, the Independent Monitor had jurisdiction only over employer 
conduct, and not union conduct that occurred away from the workplace or in a manner in 
which management did not know or should not have known about the conduct. Nonetheless, 
the Independent Monitor urged non-employee union organizers who, in his opinion, 
interfered with the right to refrain to cease and desist from such conduct. 
 74. The following list of components is based on the author’s first-hand knowledge of 
the IM program. 
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Finally, the OIM periodically would report to the Board of Directors of 
FirstGroup regarding its activities and findings with regard to the Program itself.  
During the Program’s three-year tenure,75 the OIM received 372 alleged 
violations of the FoA Policy and issued 143 reports (seventy-two of the allegations 
were found to be outside the jurisdiction of the Program, and thirty-two of the 
allegations were withdrawn). Slightly over one-half of the complaints were filed by 
employees while the other complaints were filed, in most part, by the union. (The 
company referred five complaints to the Program.) The vast majority of the 
complaints arose from First Student facilities—the company experiencing the 
greatest amount of union organizing—though complaints were also filed with 
respect to First Transit, First Services, Greyhound, and First Canada facilities. The 
OIM “found 67 FoA Policy violations and made 152 recommendations. The 
company adopted 51% of those recommendations, modified 16% of them, and 
rejected 33% of them.”76 
The following characteristics of the Program attributed to the general success of 
the Program and use by employees and unions alike, increased awareness of 
employees’ freedom of association rights, and led to management training and a 
modified culture within FirstGroup America. 
First, the Program provided for an expeditious process. During the Program’s 
tenure, complaints were investigated and reported on within forty-five days on 
average, and 85% of the cases were completed in less than ninety days.77 One of 
the reasons for the expeditious nature of the process is that it did not require 
hearings.  
When a complaint was filed with the OIM, the OIM immediately notified senior 
executives at FirstGroup of the filing of the complaint and assigned it to an 
investigator. The investigator then contacted the complaining party, generally 
within a few days, to introduce himself, describe the process, and gather additional 
information about the complaint. The investigator then contacted the contract 
manager at the location to do the same. Depending on the scope of the complaint 
and the factual disputes at issue (if any), the investigator then either scheduled an 
on-site investigation or continued to conduct the investigation telephonically. None 
of the interviews were taken under oath or transcribed.78  
                                                                                                                 
 
 75. Following Sir Moir Lockhead’s retirement in 2010, the Company terminated the 
Program on December 31, 2010, citing the increased percentage of its workforce that was 
organized and a decrease in the number of complaints filed with the Independent Monitor, 
among other reasons. 
 76. Gould, Using an Independent Monitor, supra note 41, at 53. 
 77. With additional resources dedicated to a program such as this, these timetables could 
be reduced even further.  
 78. In the investigation conducted by the court-appointed examiner in the Lehman 
Brothers bankruptcy case, the examiner adopted a similar approach as a means to expedite 
the process and obtain cooperation of several hundred witnesses who were interviewed. See 
Letter from Anton R. Valukas, Examiner, In re Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc., No. 08-13555 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010), to Diana Adams, United States Trustee (Apr. 1, 2010) (regarding 
Best Practices for Examiners) (on file with Andrew Olejnik, Associate, Jenner & Block 
LLP). 
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The Program relied on the cooperation of the parties and a thorough 
investigation by the OIM to uncover any inconsistencies and to find the facts—the 
OIM did not have a subpoena power. After the investigation and generally within 
thirty days, the investigator prepared a report for the Independent Monitor laying 
out the facts. The Independent Monitor then analyzed the facts, requested 
additional factual investigation by the investigator (if necessary), and prepared a 
final report for the complaining party and the company addressing whether there 
had been a violation of the FoA Policy. If the Independent Monitor found a 
violation, he then made recommendations for actions to be taken by the company to 
cure the violation. The company then had thirty days to adopt, not adopt, or modify 
the recommendations and communicated its response to both the OIM and the 
complaining party. 
Second, the Program was voluntary. Nothing in the Program prohibited a party 
from filing a complaint with the NLRB or any other public agency at any time— 
before, during, or after a complaint was filed. However, faith in the impartiality of 
the Independent Monitor, based on his reputation and expertise, as well as comfort 
with communicating with the OIM’s investigators generated confidence in the 
Program and a willingness to utilize it.79  
Third, the Program emphasized transparency. As noted above, the Independent 
Monitor’s reports were distributed to both the complaining party and the company, 
and the company’s responses to any recommendations were communicated to both 
the OIM and the complaining party. Nothing in the Program prohibited either of the 
parties from further distributing or communicating the findings, conclusions, and 
recommendations to others. 
Fourth, the Program was not overly formalistic, thereby making it accessible to 
employees. The Program’s complaint form comprised two pages which requested 
basic identifying information about the complaining party, company location, 
witnesses, date and location of the incident, and a description of the alleged 
violation. Complaining parties were free and welcome to submit additional 
paperwork in support of their allegations, but such detail was not necessary to 
initiate an investigation. The OIM received allegations ranging from one sentence 
to several pages. The informal interview process allowed the OIM to obtain 
additional information about the allegations and minimize the barrier to entry that 
an overly burdensome complaint process might impose. 
Fifth, the FoA Policy and Independent Monitor Program were more expansive 
than the NLRA. The most prominent example of the FoA Policy’s expansiveness 
was the limitations that it placed on the employer’s ability to engage in speech that 
was intended to influence employees’ decision with respect to labor union 
representation. Other examples of the expansiveness of the FoA Policy also 
emerged during the course of the Program and are described below.  
Sixth, the Program provided for publicity of employees’ rights that was more 
expansive than the NLRA. The NLRA, in contrast to modern employment law 
                                                                                                                 
 
 79. It was not uncommon for employees or union organizers to express skepticism about 
the Program because it was funded by FirstGroup. However, in every investigation in which 
this concern was raised, the investigator was able to alleviate the concerns by explaining the 
credentials of the Independent Monitor and the fact that neither the Independent Monitor nor 
the investigators were employed by or dependent on the company. 
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statutes, does not provide for any publicity of employees’ rights. In contrast to all 
other legislation, no notice advising employees or applicants about the nature of the 
law is required.80 Accordingly, the provision for publicity in the Program provided 
a benefit that is not available under U.S. labor law. As part of the rollout of the 
Program, the company, at the OIM’s direction, took several steps to notify 
employees of the FoA Policy and Program and to educate them on their meaning.  
On April 25, 2008, the company mailed a letter authored by the Independent 
Monitor to more than 81,000 FirstGroup employees throughout the United States. It 
described the Independent Monitor Program, the complaint procedure, and the 
machinery attached to it. The Independent Monitor’s letter was accompanied by a 
supportive letter from Dean Finch, then Chief Operating Officer for FirstGroup 
America. Because this communication was so abbreviated—it consisted of just two 
pages—it seemed to have caught the attention of many employees. Following that 
letter, the company and the OIM took several other steps to improve 
(1) employees’ awareness and understanding of the FoA Policy and Program, and 
(2) management’s adherence to the FoA Policy.  
Every FirstGroup America facility was outfitted with a glass-enclosed bulletin 
board on which a copy of the FoA Policy and an overview of the program were 
posted. The documents provided the contact information for the OIM in the event 
an employee wanted to obtain copies of the Program documents or additional 
information about the Program—which they also could obtain from their local 
manager. 
The company also conducted a web-based training program for the FirstGroup 
America managers throughout the United States. The training program explained 
the FoA Policy and Program, described what managers could and could not do, 
recommended actions that managers should take, and advised managers that failure 
to comply with any aspect of the FoA Policy or Program would subject the 
managers to discipline, up to and including discharge. 
Beginning in June 2008, FirstGroup attached a short letter about the Program to 
employees’ paychecks so that the employees would be aware of the Program even 
if they did not observe the glass-enclosed bulletin board and were not advised of it 
by local management. Additionally, the company included in its employee 
handbooks the FoA Policy and Program description, overview, and complaint form. 
The FirstGroup also filmed and distributed a DVD video describing the FoA 
Policy and Program and their contours and parameters. In the video, Mike Murray, 
then Chief Executive Officer of Operations for FirstGroup America, explained to 
the employees the FoA Policy and why it was important to the company. The 
Independent Monitor then explained the Program and the OIM’s complaint, 
investigation, and reporting procedures. The DVD video was shown to employees 
at monthly safety meetings.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 80. The Obama Board has proposed rulemaking to reverse this anomaly. See Proposed 
Rules Governing Notification of Employee Rights under the National Labor Relations Act, 
29 C.F.R. pt. 104 (2010). This, along with the Board’s decision to transmit notices of 
statutory violations electronically as well as post them in conspicuous places in the 
employer’s establishment, may assist in making employees aware of the statute and its 
remedies. See J & R Flooring, Inc., 356 N.L.R.B. No. 9 (Oct. 22, 2010). 
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Finally, the OIM established a website through which employees and others 
could obtain more information about the Program and could contact the OIM. 
Using the website, employees could download Program documents (including a 
complaint form), submit a complaint electronically, find answers to frequently 
asked questions about the Program, and learn more about the team of investigators. 
In sum, these aspects of the Program—expediency, voluntariness, transparency, 
lack of formalism, expansiveness, and publicity—led to the success and 
attractiveness of the Program. 
V. STANDARDS ADOPTED BY THE INDEPENDENT MONITOR IN RESOLVING DISPUTES 
As noted above, the FoA Policy and Independent Monitor Program were 
designed to promote rights within the backdrop of the principles of the NLRA as 
defined by the NLRB. Although the Independent Monitor primarily relied upon 
those principles in analyzing alleged violations of the FoA Policy, there were a 
number of instances in which the FoA Policy enhanced employees’ rights under the 
NLRA. Differences between the FoA Policy/Program and the NLRA stemmed 
from the fact that the Program explicitly states that the scope of protection afforded 
to employees was more expansive than that in the NLRA itself. 
A. Employer Speech 
The first and foremost illustration of this proposition is the prohibition against 
anti-union speech which disparages the union and its organizational efforts. This 
contrasts with the NLRA, particularly through its Taft-Hartley amendments, which 
contain a so-called free speech proviso set forth in section 8(c) providing for anti-
union employer free speech so long as threats or promises of benefit are not 
employed.81 The FoA Policy, on the other hand, reflects the company’s publicly 
expressed posture of neutrality toward union organizational efforts, in contrast to 
Taft-Hartley, which allows the employer to be anti-union in its speech and 
commentary so long as it does so within defined limits.82 The FoA Policy comports 
more generally with the proposition that robust free speech is properly engaged in 
by all sides—at least in the sense that both sides should have an opportunity to get 
its message across. The policy provides that an employer does have a legitimate 
interest in setting forth its point of view on unionization issues and yet one which 
circumscribes employer speech more severely than the NLRA provides.83 Thus, for 
instance, selective use of data about union success in representing employees is 
prohibited—the employer being required to present a balanced and full picture and 
one that does not, through its selectivity, disparage the union with a non-objective 
propaganda-type message. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 81. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 8(c), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2006). 
 82. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969). See also Eldorado 
Tool, 325 N.L.R.B. 222, 225 (1997) (Gould, Chairman, concurring and dissenting). 
 83. Shepherd Tissue, Inc. 326 N.L.R.B. 369 (1998) (Gould, Chairman, concurring); 
Eldorado Tool, 325 N.L.R.B. at 225 (Gould, Chairman, concurring and dissenting); 
Caterpillar, Inc., 321 N.L.R.B. 1178, 1184 (1996) (Gould, Chairman, concurring); Novotel 
New York, 321 N.L.R.B. 624 (1996).  
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B. Solicitation, Distribution, Talking, and Union Insignia Rules 
Another common subject of dispute addressed by the Independent Monitor 
involved various kinds of union tactics on company property. Such examples 
include the attempt to solicit, and thus recruit, members to the union, the 
distribution of literature about union activity, and the wearing of union insignia. 
Considerable confusion existed in distinguishing between the concepts of 
solicitation and distribution, a difficulty no doubt exacerbated by some of the 
convoluted rules laid down by the Board itself.  
Though, under the Program, nonemployee union organizers were explicitly 
precluded from obtaining access to company property in the same fashion as the 
Supreme Court decreed in Lechmere v. NLRB,84 the Independent Monitor held that 
employees have the same right to solicit during nonworking time in line with 
Supreme Court precedent.85 From the beginning, the U.S. Supreme Court 
established relatively clear rules that protected both rights during nonworking time, 
that is, “working time is for work.”86 And, in contrast to the rules relating to 
insignia and discussion, both of which are generally protected during working time 
as well, solicitation involves the actual distribution of authorization cards which 
employees are asked to sign. But, in the Board’s 1962 Stoddard-Quirk 
Manufacturing Co. decision, the case’s holding considerably muddied the waters, 
ruling that distribution of literature, in contrast to solicitation, could be precluded 
during nonworking time in working areas.87 The court relied on the potential for 
littering as its justification, as it may undercut the employer’s production 
objectives.88 At the time of this decision, I thought that a limitation of the decision 
was the fact that in many, if not most workplaces, a clear demarcation line could 
not be established between working and nonworking areas89 and that, at a 
minimum, this issue would unnecessarily promote litigation. In the 1990s, the 
Board concluded that where the demarcation line between nonworking and 
working areas was ambiguous, section 7 organizational rights were chilled—this 
case, ironically, arose in one of the FirstGroup predecessor facilities.90  
As for employees talking about the union, consistent with Board precedent, the 
Independent Monitor held that talking may take place during both working and 
nonworking time since the company did not have a policy (which employers rarely 
                                                                                                                 
 
 84. 502 U.S. 527 (1992). 
 85. Republic Aviation Corp., 324 U.S. 793, 801–05 (1945) (citing Peyton Packing Co., 
49 N.L.R.B. 828 (1943)) (approving the Peyton Packing rule and holding that union insignia 
constitutes protected activity under the NLRA during both working and nonworking time); 
see also Eastern Omni Constructors, Inc., 324 N.L.R.B. 652, 655 (1997) (“Employees have 
the protected right to wear union insignia while at work.” (citing Republic Aviation Corp., 
324 U.S. at 801–03), enforcement denied, Eastern Omni Constructors, Inc. v. NLRB, 170 
F.3d 418, 428 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 86. This concept was first adumbrated in Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828 (1943). 
 87. 138 N.L.R.B. 615, 621 (1962). 
 88. Id. at 630. 
 89. William B. Gould IV, The Question of Union Activity on Company Property, 18 
VAND. L. REV. 73, 80 (1964). 
 90. See Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 315 N.L.R.B. 79, 83 (1994). 
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do) prohibiting all conversations about all non-work-related matters during working 
time itself.91 And, with respect to the wearing of union insignia, again consistent 
with Board precedent, the Independent Monitor held that the employer can prohibit 
such union activity during nonworking time if it has “special circumstances” to do 
so.92 
Throughout the tenure of the Program, the OIM observed the difficulties 
involved with the practical application of definitions. However, in working in 
conjunction with the Independent Monitor, FirstGroup improved the guidelines 
provided to employees and managers with respect to solicitation, distribution, and 
talking, though concerns still remained stemming from the difficulty in requiring 
employees to guess what constitute proper boundaries between working and 
nonworking areas.  
The Independent Monitor also addressed an issue of more recent vintage for the 
Board—employee use of e-mails to communicate about union organizational 
activity. The Independent Monitor held that sending an e-mail communication 
involving union organizational activity constituted activity protected by the FoA 
Policy.93 This is in sharp contrast to the position that the Board has taken more 
recently in upholding an employer’s policy that barred employees from using the 
company’s e-mail system for all non-job-related solicitations,94 though the Board 
now has the issue under reconsideration.95 In essence, the Independent Monitor was 
of the view that e-mail communications as a form of union organizational activity, 
while different in form than solicitation and distribution of literature on company 
property, constitutes the very same thing in substance. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 91. Double Eagle Hotel & Casino v. NLRB, 414 F.3d 1249, 1253 (10th Cir. 2005); see 
also W.W. Grainger, Inc., 229 N.L.R.B. 161, 166 (1977) (asserting that no discussion rules 
should be distinguished from no solicitation rules). 
 92. Meijer, Inc., 318 N.L.R.B. 50, 50 (1995) (quoting United Parcel Service, 312 
N.L.R.B. 596, 597 (1993), enforcement denied, 41 F.3d 1068, 1073 (6th Cir. 1994)); see 
BellSouth Telecomm. Inc., 335 N.L.R.B. 1066 (2001), enforcement denied by Lee v. NLRB, 
393 F.3d 491, 497 (4th Cir. 2005); Burger King v. NLRB, 725 F.2d 1053 (6th Cir. 1984), 
denying enforcement in relevant part of 265 N.L.R.B. 1507 (1982); Cf. Washington State 
Nurses Assoc. v. NLRB, 526 F.3d 577 (9th Cir. May 20, 2008); Pioneer Hotel & Gambling 
Hall, Inc., 324 N.L.R.B. 918, 922–23 (1997) enforcement in part, 182 F.3d 939 (D.C. Cir. 
1999). 
 93. See Timekeeping Systems, Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 244 (1997) (a unanimous Board held 
that the sending of an e-mail message about working conditions was concerted activity 
within the meaning of the NLRA and that an employee does not lose the protection of the 
NLRA through his or her attempt to communicate with other employees on such subjects 
merely because e-mail was used). 
 94. See Guard Publ’g Co., 351 N.L.R.B. 1110 (2007). 
 95. See Guard Publ’g Co. v. NLRB, 571 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (finding that 
substantial evidence did not support the Board’s determination that the employer acted 
lawfully in discriminating against an employee for two union-related e-mails and remanding 
the case to the Board for further proceedings), enforcing in part and remanding in part 
Guard Publ’g Co., 351 N.L.R.B. 1110 (2007). In the D.C. Circuit’s opinion, the court noted 
that, although the union believed that the company violated section 8(a)(1) by maintaining a 
policy that prohibited e-mail use for all “non-job-related solicitations,” it did not seek review 
of the Board’s ruling to the contrary. Guard Publ’g, 571 F.3d at 58.  
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C. Expeditious Elections 
Another area in which the FoA Policy and Program offered more protections to 
employees’ right to freedom of association was the company’s commitment to 
expeditious elections. The company concluded that representation elections should 
be “held as early as possible” inasmuch as one principal concern with elections is 
that the delay inherent in the process is often associated with the erosion of 
employee free choice. For instance, the Independent Monitor held that appealing 
the Regional Director’s decision to Washington, D.C., would undercut an 
expeditious election process and thus the right to choose freely absent 
“extraordinary circumstances.” The Independent Monitor stated that FirstGroup 
should agree under the Board’s rules and regulations to enter into consent election 
agreements, which would make a Regional Director’s decision final.  
D. Interrogation of Employees 
Because the FoA Policy provides for representation elections rather than 
voluntary card checks, the Independent Monitor held that no form of interrogation 
would be permissible under the FoA Policy. In contrast to the standards created by 
the Board under the NLRA, FirstGroup had no legitimate interest in determining 
employee sentiment. An inquiry by management of an employee’s view of union 
representation would only be legitimate if the employer was attempting to 
determine whether employee sentiment made it appropriate for the employer to 
recognize the union on some basis other than a secret ballot box election. Under the 
NLRA, the interrogation of an employee’s support for the union or involvement in 
union activities depends upon a number of factors.96 The case law is supposed to 
protect employees against a threat of reprisal or force or a promise of a benefit. But, 
as noted above, under the FoA Policy, no careful delineation need be drawn 
between interrogation that is precluded and that which is permitted, because 
recognition on the basis of union cards is out of the question since only card 
recognition would involve employee sentiment expressed outside the ballot box. In 
these circumstances, management has no business interrogating the employee.97 
                                                                                                                 
 
 96. See Blue Flash Express, Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. 591, 593 (1954) (explaining that the test 
for determining whether an interrogation is coercive is “whether, under all the 
circumstances, the interrogation reasonably tends to restrain or interfere with the employees 
in the exercise of rights guaranteed by the Act”); Struksnes Construction Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 
1062 (1967) (expanding and explaining the Blue Flash Express test); see also Rossmore 
House, 269 N.L.R.B. 1176 (1984), aff’d, Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Union 
Local 11 v. NLRB, 760 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1985); NLRB v. Lorben Corp., 345 F.2d 346 (2d 
Cir. 1965). For the Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncements on interrogation, see 
Allentown Mack Sales & Services, Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359 (1998).  
 97. This approach is somewhat akin to the approach taken by the Board before the 
advent of the Eisenhower Administration. See Standard-Coosa-Thatcher Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 
1358 (1949). 
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E. Surveillance 
Finally, a number of complaints occurred where allegations of surveillance were 
involved. The Independent Monitor followed decisions of the Clinton Board98 and 
attempted to establish a demarcation line between observation of open and public 
union activity, which is protected, and that which is “out of the ordinary,” for 
example, taking note of which employees received union hand bills.99 The test 
implemented by the Independent Monitor, as has been implemented by the Board, 
was whether “observation goes beyond casual and becomes unduly intrusive.”100 
VI. LEGAL QUESTIONS ARISING FROM THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROGRAM 
As is often the case when unprecedented private programs are implemented, 
questions arise as to how the private machinery fits within the body of existing 
public law. This Part addresses several of those questions, including: whether 
deference to the Program can and should be provided by the NLRB, as is the case 
with grievance-arbitration machinery; and whether the Program, once implemented, 
becomes a contract that can be enforced by employees or unions, amongst others. 
A. Discrimination 
Discrimination cases are another example of the extensive reach of the FoA that 
went beyond the NLRA.101 The Supreme Court has held, at the Board’s urging, that 
a violation may be made out in some “mixed motive” cases: that is, those in which 
one reason amongst at least four employer actions taken is non-discriminatory but 
the other reasons are in fact anti-union.102 On the other hand, in accordance with the 
position I took while serving on the Board, under the FoA Policy, when one of a 
number of reasons is discriminatory, a violation must be found.103 
B. Deferral 
For the past half-century, ever since the NLRB’s decision in Spielberg 
Manufacturing Co.,104 there have been many twists and turns and much debate and 
scholarship regarding the Board’s deferral policy toward arbitral decisions.105 
                                                                                                                 
 
 98. See Nat’l Steel & Shipbuilding Co., 324 N.L.R.B. 499 (1997), enforced, Nat’l Steel 
& Shipbuilding Co. v. NLRB, 156 F.3d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 99. Opryland Hotel, 323 N.L.R.B. 723, 730 (1997).  
 100. Local Joint Executive Board of Las Vegas v. NLRB, 515 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 
2008) (quoting Kenworth Truck Co., 327 N.L.R.B. 497, 501 (1999)).  
 101. In this arena, both the Obama and Clinton Boards have held so-called “pre-emptive” 
discharges to be a violation. See Paraxel Int’l, LLC 356 NRLB No. 82 (Jan. 28, 2011); 
Koronis Part Inc. 324 NRLB 675 689 (1997). 
 102. NLRB v. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983).  
 103. See Frick Paper Co., 319 N.L.R.B. 9, 12 (1995) (Gould, Chairman, concurring). 
 104. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955). 
 105. See, e.g., Raymond G. Bush, The Nature of the Deferral Problem Involving Section 
8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) Charges, 4 LAB. LAW. 103 (1988); Leonard Page & Daniel W. Sherrick, 
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However, following the Board’s 1984 decisions, the NLRB’s standards have been 
generally consistent.106 In its Spielberg decision, the Board held that it would defer 
to an arbitration award where (1) the proceedings appear to have been “fair and 
regular,” (2) “all parties [have] agreed to be bound,” and (3) the arbitral decision “is 
not clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies of the Act.”107 In its Olin 
decision, the Board added that it would find that an arbitrator considered an unfair 
labor practice if “(1) the contractual issue is factually parallel to the unfair labor 
practice issue, and (2) the arbitrator was presented generally with the facts relevant 
to resolving the unfair labor practices.”108 
In all of these cases, the deferral question arose where a collective bargaining 
agreement was in place. In my view, however, there is nothing in the Board’s 
analysis that would limit deferral to such circumstances.109 Where a collective 
bargaining agreement does not exist, the Board may be more stringent in requiring 
clear evidence that all parties have agreed to be bound by the arbitral award, but 
such circumstance is not precluded. Again, however, the Board has said that “it is 
patently contrary to the letter and spirit of the Act for the Board to defer its 
undoubted jurisdiction to decide unfair labor practices to a disputes settlement 
system established unilaterally by an employer.”110 Thus, unilateral programs have 
been looked upon as contrary to public policy.111 
                                                                                                                 
The NLRB’s Deferral Policy and Union Reform: A Union Perspective, 24 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 647 (1991).  
 106. See, e.g., United Techs. Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557 (1984); Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 
573 (1984). But see Taylor v. NLRB, 786 F.2d 1516 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that deferral 
was not warranted and explaining that the Board’s standards under Olin Corp. “cannot be 
reconciled with the need to protect statutory rights, as expressed by the Supreme Court”). 
 107. Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. at 1082. In Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. at 574, the 
Board stated that it would defer to an arbitrator’s award unless the award is “palpably 
wrong,” that is, “unless the arbitrator’s decision is not susceptible to an interpretation 
consistent with the Act.” The Board also placed the burden on the party challenging deferral. 
Id. But see Mobile Oil Exploration & Producing, U.S., Inc., 325 N.L.R.B. 176, 180 (1997) 
(Chairman Gould, concurring), enforced, Mobile Oil Exploration & Producing v. NLRB, 
200 F.3d 230 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 108. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. at 574. 
 109. In Pontiac Osteopathic Hospital, 284 N.L.R.B. 442 (1987), an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) ruled that deferral by the NLRB to the decision of the employer’s appeal board 
was inappropriate. Although the ALJ noted that there was no collective bargaining 
agreement in place, the ALJ emphasized that the appeals board system was not an agreed-on 
method between the employer and its employees. Id. The assumption was that an agreed-
upon procedure with or without a collective bargaining agreement is a prerequisite. Id. 
 110. Am. League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 180 N.L.R.B. 190, 191 (1969). 
 111. See, e.g., Pontiac Osteopathic Hosp., 284 N.L.R.B. at 466 (“[M]anagement 
unilaterally implemented the appeals board system. Neither the concept of an appeals board 
nor the procedural rules that had been drafted and approved by management were submitted 
to the employees for a vote of approval or disapproval. Whatever else the appeals board 
system may be, it is not an agreed-on method between this Employer and its employees for 
dispute resolution. It is not a grievance procedure established by contract. It was created and 
implemented unilaterally by Respondent. The employees did not voluntarily elect to become 
parties to a collective-bargaining agreement containing this or any other form of dispute 
resolution machinery.”). But see West Maui Resort Partners, 340 N.L.R.B. 846, 850–51 
(2003) (holding that an independent party appointed by the employer to issue a report on 
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In the case of FirstGroup’s Independent Monitor Program, the company did not 
agree to be bound by the Independent Monitor’s findings and recommendations, 
which would likely prove fatal to any argument in support of Board deferral to the 
Program. Nonetheless, if an employer were to agree to be bound, an employee’s or 
a union’s voluntary use of the Program and execution of clear and unambiguous 
agreement to be bound by or resort to the Independent Monitor’s decision could 
satisfy the Board’s requirement that all parties have agreed to be bound.112 As for 
the other deferral policy considerations, the processes and procedures of the 
Program were designed with the backdrop of the NLRA to constitute a “fair and 
regular” process whereby all the relevant facts pertaining to an alleged unfair labor 
practice would be considered. The absence of a hearing might arguably constitute a 
procedure that is not fair and regular—and yet this absence of a process that 
contributes so mightily to delay is one of the features that make the process both 
effective and expeditious.113 Moreover, a review of the Independent Monitor’s 
findings and conclusions—again, grounded in the NLRA—as well as the abundant 
use of the Program by employees and union representatives, support a conclusion 
that the decisions reached by the Independent Monitor were not “clearly repugnant 
to the purposes and policies of the Act.” Indeed, as one can see from a wide variety 
of issues discussed above—the most prominent of them being the company’s 
neutrality policy—the IM program protects more effectively the basic policies of 
the NLRA than the statute does itself.114  
Thus, a private program to adjudicate freedom of association disputes, which is 
binding on the employer and complaining party, could satisfy the Board’s deferral 
policy standards. In light of the strong support and wide acceptance that voluntary 
arbitration of labor disputes has received in the grievance-arbitration context, the 
                                                                                                                 
NLRA matters is lawful: “None of the parties disputes Hunter’s credentials as an 
experienced, neutral investigator; nor is there any evidence of collusion between Hunter and 
the Respondent with respect to his investigation or his findings. There is no allegation or 
evidence that Hunter was given any instruction that would have affected his ultimate 
findings, or that he made any references to union activities when interviewing the 
discriminatees that would have tended to have a coercive impact against their engaging in 
Section 7 activity.” (footnote omitted)).  
 112. Cf. Mahon v. NLRB, 808 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that a union was 
empowered to bind union members to terms of a pre-arbitration settlement agreement despite 
its terms barring members from bringing claims for back pay under the NLRA); Roadway 
Express v. NLRB, 647 F.2d 415, 424 (4th Cir. 1981) (deferring to a settlement agreement 
and holding that an employee “fully and freely acted” upon a settlement agreement where he 
authorized his union advisor to accept its terms without back-pay, but without loss of 
seniority). 
 113. See George A. Bermann, Administrative Delay and Its Control, 30 AM. J. COMP. L. 
SUP. 473, 474 (1982) (“The path to systemic reform . . . probably lies not only in easing 
agency workloads and increasing their resources, but also in recognizing that trial-type 
procedures are not necessarily the best or only fair means of reaching administrative 
decisions.”).  
 114. William B. Gould IV, Labor Law Beyond U.S. Borders: Does What Happens 
Outside of America Stay Outside of America?, 21 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 401, 422–26 
(2010). 
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extension of the Board’s deferral policy to private programs designed to adjudicate 
disputes arising during a union organizational campaign, would be appropriate.115  
C. Enforceability of Program 
The implementation of private dispute resolution machinery, such as the 
Independent Monitor Program, even if unilaterally adopted by an employer, could 
constitute an implied, enforceable contract in some jurisdictions.116 The implied 
contract theory is predicated on the notion that an employer should not be permitted 
to “reap the benefits of a personnel manual and at the same time avoid promises 
freely made in the manual that employees reasonably believed were part of their 
arrangement with the employer.”117 Factors to be considered in determining 
whether a policy will become binding include the level of specificity of the policy, 
employee acknowledgment of the policy, disclaimer language, the manner of 
distribution of the policy, and whether employee rights or obligations are defined in 
the handbook, among other things. Moreover, if a handbook policy were to be 
found to be a binding contract, at least a few jurisdictions may not permit 
modifications to the Program absent additional consideration,118 and, where 
affected employees are covered by collective bargaining agreements, unilateral 
modifications to the machinery could violate section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA, which 
makes it an unfair labor practice to refuse to bargain collectively with employees’ 
representatives.119 Accordingly, employers intending to implement such machinery 
would be well advised to consider the state law in the relevant jurisdictions to 
understand whether the machinery might be found to be binding. 
In the case of FirstGroup, the FoA Policy and Program documents were 
distributed to employees, posted at company facilities, and included in the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 115. Indeed, such an approach can be deemed consistent with Board holdings such as 
Lexington Health Care Grp., 328 N.L.R.B. 894 (1999) (promoting negotiation of agreements 
relating to union organizational activity) and Dana Corp., 356 N.L.R.B. 49 (2010) (honoring 
voluntary recognition of majority status union). 
 116. See GOULD, PRIMER, supra note 8, at 226–28 (citing cases from various jurisdictions 
on this principle). 
 117. O’Brien v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 664 N.E.2d 843, 848 (Mass. 1996) (“The 
principle that promises made in a personnel manual may be binding on an employer is 
accepted in a clear majority of American jurisdictions.”); see also Richard J. Pratt, 
Comment, Unilateral Modification of Employment Handbooks: Further Encroachments on 
the Employment-at-Will Doctrine, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 197, 208–09 (1990). 
 118. See GOULD, PRIMER, supra note 8, at 228 (citing jurisdictions and cases on this 
point). 
 119. National Labor Relations Act § 8(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (2006). The fact that 
proceedings or conditions are not in the language of the collective bargaining agreement 
does not mean that the employer is not obliged to bargain with the union. See 
Bonnell/Tredegar Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 46 F.3d 339 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that since the 
method of calculating Christmas bonus was stated in employee handbook and had become 
custom within the company for many years, discontinuance of calculation method by the 
company—without bargaining to impasse—constituted violation of its duty to bargain under 
NLRA § 8(d), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)); see also Wald Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 426 F.2d 
1328 (6th Cir. 1970). 
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company’s National Employee Handbook. The FoA Policy included a legend at the 
bottom of the policy that stated, “THE COMPANY RESERVES THE RIGHT TO 
MAKE CHANGES AND/OR REVISIONS TO THIS POLICY AT ANY TIME.” 
Similarly, the written description of the Program stated, “FirstGroup may modify or 
terminate its FoA Policy and this Program at any time.” In addition, the Employee 
Handbook stated that neither it, nor any other supplemental handbooks or policies 
constituted an employment contract or agreement.120  
VII. PRIVATE INITIATIVES AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO LABOR LAW 
DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION  
The Independent Monitor process came into existence against the backdrop of 
the above noted weaknesses in the NLRA as well as the Bush II Board’s abdication 
of its statutory responsibilities in this new century. Under these circumstances, 
unions, even when excluded from negotiation of the mechanism as was the case in 
FirstGroup, saw the Independent Monitor Program as an enhanced surrogate for the 
NLRA. During the tenure of the Program, union membership increased from 
approximately 18% to more than 80%, which, in part, may have led to the 
termination of the Program as of December 31, 2010.121 
Meanwhile, the Obama Administration has taken a number of initiatives which 
proceeded on essentially three fronts. First, Executive Order 13494, entitled 
“Economy in Government Contracting,” instructs contracting agencies to “treat as 
unallowable the costs of any activities undertaken [by federal contractors] to 
persuade employees . . . to exercise or not to exercise . . . the right to organize [a 
union].”122 However, two immediate problems for this initiative are the doctrines of 
primary jurisdiction and preemption created under the authority of the leading 
Supreme Court decisions.123 Justice Stevens, speaking for the majority, held that, 
inasmuch as the Taft-Hartley amendments to the NLRA “protect” noncoercive 
employer free speech from regulation, California, through exercise of the state’s 
spending power, had regulated employer speech unconstitutionally. Other attempts 
through executive order involving the right of employers to permanently replace 
economic strikers who engage in protected activity have also been struck down.124 
                                                                                                                 
 
 120. But see supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 121. See Gould, Using an Independent Monitor, supra note 41, at 52. From late 2007 at 
the commencement of the Independent Monitor’s Program through early 2010 
approximately 330 elections were held with unions winning 90% of them. FIRSTGROUP, 
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 21 (2010), 
http://www.firstgroup.com/corporate/csr/csr_report_2010/. Prior to discussions about a 
national agreement, FirstGroup had stated that union membership was 66%, having 
increased 11% over the past year. Id. at 21. 
 122. Exec. Order No. 13494, 74 Fed. Reg. 6101 (Feb. 4, 2009). For a more detailed 
discussion of this Order, see David Edeli, Is Executive Order 13494 Preempted Under 
Chamber of Commerce v. Brown?, (July 5, 2010) (unpublished note) (on file with author).  
 123. See Lodge 76, International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. 
Wis. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976) (primary jurisdiction); San Diego Bldg. 
Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) (preemption).  
 124. See Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see 
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It is possible that the allowable costs approach undertaken by the Obama 
Administration may be distinguishable from the limitations upon expenditures 
condemned by the Court in Brown125 inasmuch as they arguably do not plunge the 
contractor into the quagmire of accounting noted by Justice Stevens. This 
distinction seems at this point to be uncertain, leaving the executive order open to 
constitutional challenge. 
So called Project Labor Agreements, which require adherence to the terms of a 
collective bargaining agreement and conditions of employment as a prerequisite for 
competitive bidding,126 have been held to be constitutional by the United States 
Supreme Court as the government acting as a market participant,127 
notwithstanding new legal issues that may be presented by virtue of the veto of 
such agreements by various localities.128 These contracts, while not discriminatory 
towards either non-union employees129 or contractors, promote unionized labor and 
the badly needed objective of stimulus for the economy and infrastructure. If the 
Obama Project Labor Agreements continue to grow, construction industry 
unionization is promoted along with important projects.  
Finally, the Obama Administration, with considerable Republican opposition of 
the kind that manifested itself when I was nominated as Chairman in the 1990s,130 
has moved ahead with a newly constituted National Labor Relations Board.131 
Through an acting general counsel, the importance of section 10(j) injunctions has 
been stressed.132 The Board is poised to challenge state statutes that mandate secret 
                                                                                                                 
also N. Ill. Chapter of Associated Builders & Contractors v. Lavin, 431 F.3d 1004, 1006 (7th 
Cir. 2005) (prohibiting spending which becomes regulation when it affects conduct outside 
the finance project), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 813 (2006); Metro Milwaukee Commerce v. 
Milwaukee Cnty., 431 F.3d 277, 282 (7th Cir. 2005) (discussion by Judge Posner regarding 
the “spillover effect”). 
 125. Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, 554 U.S. 60 (2008). 
 126. These Project Labor Agreements are well discussed in Dale Belman & Matthew M. 
Bodah, Building Better: A Look at Best Practices for the Design of Project Labor 
Agreements, 2010 ECON. POL’Y INST. 274.  
 127. See Building & Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contractors of 
Mass./R.I., 507 U.S. 218 (1993) (Boston Harbor). 
 128. See Steven Greenhouse, Taking a Vote on Union Construction, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 
2010, at B1. 
 129. See Local 357, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 
(1961).  
 130. See GOULD, LABORED RELATIONS, supra note 5, at 33–50. 
 131. See Press Release, White House, President Obama Announces Recess Appointments 
to Key Administration Positions (Mar. 27, 2010), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/president-obama-announces-recess-
appointments-key-administration-positions; Press Release, White House, Brian Hayes, Mark 
Pearce Confirmed by Senate as Board Members (June 22, 2010), available at 
http://www.hilaborlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/NLRB-Confirmation.pdf); see also 
Hans Nichols & Holly Rosenkrantz, Obama Bypasses Senate, Makes Appointments to NLRB, 
Treasury, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Mar. 28, 2010, available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aKr_AXeeC82k; Sheryl Gay 
Stolberg, Obama Bypasses Senate Process, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2010 available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/28/us/politics/28recess.html. See generally Marcia Coyle, 
Labor Board Struggles for Relevance, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 8, 2010. 
 132. See Memorandum from the Office of the Gen. Counsel to All Reg’l Dirs., Officers-
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ballot elections involving exclusive bargaining representative status and are 
obviously unconstitutionally preempted by the Act.133 It has also properly 
dismissed arguments that federal employer rights are denied by state statutes that 
limit anti-union campaigns on government projects.134 True to the Clinton Board’s 
condemnation of employer discrimination against so-called “salts,”135 the Board 
has condemned discriminatory referral systems.136 Under an important case 
protecting secondary display of stationary banners, the Board has held them not to 
be violative of the secondary boycott prohibitions.137 Moreover, the Board has 
enhanced its limited remedial authority by providing for the first time for 
compound interest of back pay owed on a daily basis.138  
The problem here is not the Board’s decisions—they are carefully well reasoned 
and worthy of judicial approval. The difficulty is that the decisions reflect 
continued and enhanced polarization of the kind that has plagued the Board for the 
past two or three decades, most particularly of the Clinton era of the 1990s.139 
                                                                                                                 
in-Charge, and Resident Officers (Sept. 30, 2010). 
 133. See Letter from Lafe E. Solomon, Acting Gen. Counsel, NLRB, to the Hon. Tom 
Horne, Att’y Gen., State of Arizona (Jan. 13, 2011) (“Preemption of State of Arizona 
Constitution Article 2, Section 36 by the National Labor Relations Act.”); Letter from Lafe 
E. Solomon, Acting Gen. Counsel, NLRB, to the Hon. Alan Wilson, Att’y Gen., State of 
South Carolina (Jan. 13, 2011) (“Preemption of State of South Carolina Constitution Article 
2, Section 12 by the National Labor Relations Act.”); Letter from Lafe E. Solomon, Acting 
Gen. Counsel, NLRB, to the Hon. Marty J. Jackley, Att’y Gen., State of South Dakota (Jan. 
13, 2011) (“Preemption of State of South Dakota Constitution Article 6, Section 28 by the 
National Labor Relations Act.”); Letter from Lafe E. Solomon, Acting Gen. Counsel, NLRB, 
to the Hon. Mark L. Shurtleff, Att’y Gen., State of Utah (Jan. 13, 2011) (“Preemption of 
Utah Constitution Article 4, Section 8 by the National Labor Relations Act.”); State 
Constitutional Amendments Fact Sheet, NLRB (Jan. 14, 2011), https://www.nlrb.gov/news-
media/backgrounders/state-amendments-and-preemption-0. But see NLRB Holds Off on 
Bringing Suit Against States with Secret Ballot Protection Constitutional Amendments, LAB. 
MGMT. REL. PRACTICE GRP. (Feb. 4, 2011), http://www.laborrelationscounsel.com/union-
organizing-corporate-campaigns/nlrb-holds-off-on-bringing-suit-against-states-with-secret-
ballot-protection-constitutional-amendmen/. 
 134. See Independence Residences, Inc., 355 N.L.R.B. No. 153 (2010). 
 135. NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc. 516 U.S. 85, 94 (1995).  
 136. See KenMor Elec. Co., 355 N.L.R.B. No. 173 (2010). 
 137. See Eliason & Knuth of Ariz., Inc., 355 N.L.R.B. No. 159 (2010). Similarly, the 
Clinton Board addressed union organizational tactics with constitutional considerations as a 
backdrop. See 52nd Street Hotel Assoc., 321 NLRB No. 93 (July 8, 1996). A good 
discussion of these issues is contained in Catherine L. Fisk, Union Lawyers and Employment 
Law, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 57 (2002); see also Overstreet v. United Brotherhood 
of Carpenters & Joiners Local 1506, 409 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 138. See Jackson Hosp. Corp., 356 NLRB No. 8 (2010). 
 139. See William B. Gould IV, What Would Employee Free Choice Mean in the 
Workplace?, Presentation at the Fifty-Eighth Annual Conference of the Association of Labor 
Relations Agencies (July 20, 2009), available at http://www.law.stanford.edu/display/ 
images/dynamic/publications_pdf/Gould%20July%2020%20Speech%20to%20ALRA1.pdf; 
see also William B. Gould IV, Prospects for Labor Law Reform After the 2008 Election-
Law Perspective, (Jan. 4, 2009); William B. Gould IV, Keynote Address to State Bar of 
California Labor and Employment Law Section Annual Meeting: The Decline and 
Irrelevance of the NLRB and What Can Be Done About It: Some Reflections on Privately 
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President Obama, promising change in Washington, has settled back into the 
fifteen-year-old “batching” process, which exaggerates the ideological divide and 
puts little focus upon the appointment of experienced professionals and neutrals.140 
Already reduced to a four-member Board, all indications are that a Republican-
influenced or -controlled Congress will attempt to undermine or circumscribe the 
best of President Obama’s appointment efforts. 
Given the problematic nature of at least two of the three Obama labor initiatives, 
it is unlikely that the discussion of private agreements or policies will disappear. 
Unions may still have an interest,141 though the more balanced labor-management 
decision making of the Obama Board may make private agreements more attractive 
to employers, rather than unions. Management, for the same reasons that unions 
were attracted to private agreements in the Bush II Board era, might well become 
more interested in such initiatives in order to escape what they would view as the 
heavy hand of regulation. Whether management will be interested in genuine 
programs like the one launched by FirstGroup remains to be seen.  
CONCLUSION 
The FoA Policy and Program appeared to have been well received by both labor 
and management, notwithstanding their nonbinding quality and the fact that 
numerous violations and criticisms aimed at management were contained in the 
reports. The absence of a hearing contributed substantially to the ability of the 
process to be an expeditious one—one of the qualities which has been absent in 
labor law for at least four decades. The question of how a process such as this may 
be received by the NLRB and the courts—that is, will the reports be given some 
form of deference—remains to be answered.142 
                                                                                                                 
Devised Alternatives, (Oct. 31, 2008) (speeches on file with author). 
 140. See MACKENZIE, supra note 13. In some measure, this divide was bridged in the 
Clinton Board era. See, e.g., Makro Inc., 316 N.L.R.B. 109, 114 (1995) (Gould, Chairman, 
concurring), rev. denied sub. nom. United Food and Commercial Workers Local No. 880 v. 
NLRB, 74 F.3d 292, (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. denied 117 S. Ct. 52 (1996); Leslie Homes Inc., 
316 N.L.R.B. 123, 131 (1995) (Gould, Chairman, concurring), rev. denied sub. nom. 
Metropolitan District Council United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners v. NLRB, 68 
F.3d 71, (3d Cir. 1995); International Longshoremen’s Association, 323 N.L.R.B. 1029, 
1031 (1997) (Gould, Chairman, dissenting); Oil Workers International Union Local 1–591, 
325 N.L.R.B. 324, 330 (1998) (Gould, Chairman, concurring); White Cap, Inc., 325 NLRB 
1166, 1170 (1998) (Gould, Chairman, concurring); Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 N.L.R.B. 824, 
829-834 (1998) (Gould, Chairman, concurring and dissenting in part). A good discussion of 
this matter is contained in Coyle, supra note 131. 
 141. UAW President Bob King has recently advanced this idea in connection with 
foreign-owned automakers. See Bob King, Core Areas Where Agreement Needed, UAW 
(Dec. 30, 2010), http://www.uaw.org/story/core-areas-where-agreement-needed; see also 
Nora Macaluso, UAW’s King Says Talks with ‘Transplants’ Continuing, with Support From 
Other Unions, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), Feb. 7, 2011. 
 142. There are other issues raised by the IM approach. For instance, the key to 
determining whether a subpoena can be issued to discover third party processes is whether 
the third party acts impartially. The system of labor mediation because of its essentiality to 
“continued industrial stability [constitutes] a public interest sufficiently great to outweigh the 
interest in obtaining every person’s evidence.” NLRB v. Joseph Macaluso, Inc. 618 F.2d 51, 
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FirstGroup did not negotiate the Program with the Teamsters or any of the other 
unions because: (1) a multi-union agreement would have been difficult to obtain; 
(2) the company was undoubtedly uneasy and somewhat distrustful of the union 
because of the allegations made against it; (3) the company probably feared that the 
unions would demand a card check and the company was committed to the secret 
ballot box election process. The unions may have been receptive because in many 
instances their charges and grievances were effectively addressed (and, even when 
they were not, the process was cathartic as is the case with arbitration involving 
collective bargaining agreements), and the process was infinitely preferable in 
many instances to the Bush II NLRB, which was not only one sided and anti-union, 
but also inattentive to the actual production of cases. Now, paradoxically, it may be 
that some companies will have an interest in their own machinery for precisely the 
opposite reasons, that is, the feared vigor of the newly constituted Obama Board. 
That approach clearly will not work.  
Both sides that adopt the FirstGroup initiative must be committed to more 
protection in the form of remedies, speed, and publicity for workers than the 
NLRA. Only a balanced approach which takes labor and management beyond the 
law and effectively protects freedom of association through nonbinding reports and 
recommendations can succeed in such a venture. It may be that the globalization 
process and increased European investment in the United States will bring with it 
                                                                                                                 
56, (9th Cir. 1980). “The company argued that revocation of Hammond’s subpoena was 
improper because communications made to him during the course of the bargaining sessions 
were necessarily made in the presence of the opposing party and were not, therefore, 
confidential. Such a contention misapprehends the purpose of excluding mediator testimony 
which is to avoid a breach of impartially, not a breach of confidentiality.” Id. at n. 3; see also 
Tomlinson of High Point, Inc. 74 N.L.R.B. 681, 688 (1947); see generally Dennis R. Nolan 
& Roger I. Abrams, Arbitral Immunity, 11 INDUS. REL. L.J. 228 (1989); Matthew M. Bodah, 
What Labor Arbitrators Should Know About Arbitral Immunity: An Overview of the Law on 
Arbitrator Immunity and Its Application to Labor Arbitrators, 63 DISP. RESOL. J. 28 (2008); 
Robert L. Clayton, NRLB’s Authority and Procedures for the Issuance of Investigative 
Subpoenas, ABA, Section of Labor & Employment, Mid-Winter Meeting (Feb. 24, 2004). It 
seems more than arguable that the Independent Monitor’s communications, and 
communications to him, are protected on state constitutional grounds. See Garstang v. 
Superior Ct., 39 Cal. App. 4th 526 (1995). In that case, the court established a qualified 
privilege of ombudspeople derived from the right to privacy in the California Constitution, 
Article 1, § 1. Id. The case involved an employee at a private university who sued her 
employer and three coworkers for damages for slander and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. Id. at 530. Garstang sought to depose the three coworkers about statements made 
during informal mediation sessions with the university's ombudsperson. Id. In balancing the 
competing interests with respect to Article 1, § 1, the court held the fundamental right to 
privacy outweighed the plaintiff’s interest in disclosure. Id. at 536. The court reasoned that 
the employees had an expectation that their communications with the ombudsperson would 
remain confidential, consistent with university pledge and assurance that they could rely on 
the ombudsperson’s confidentiality. Id. While some similarities between the Independent 
Monitor and corporate ombudspeople exist, points of difference only serve to reinforce a 
right to privacy. These include, the explicit promise of independence provided in the FoA 
policy and qualifications of all serving in the IM office. Such differences provided 
heightened impartiality and independence upon which communications would garner more 
substantial expectations of privacy. 
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some elements of international and European labor law more hospitable to the 
development of trade union recognition or procedures. 
       
